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ABSTRACT
My dissertation tries to solve two puzzling questions in China’s economic miracle: why
some private firms enjoy better property rights protection than others under similar
political and economic institutional conditions. Secondly, under the incentive structure
designed by the central government, why some local officials in some localities actively
protected private property rights than others hence foster local economic development.
Existing literature either emphasizes social networks or focuses on fiscal decentralization
and personnel control system. But neither these accounts is able to systematically explain
the considerable variation of private property rights protection across regions and over
time.
I develop a game-theoretical model to study the political economy of property rights
in China, that is, a bargaining game between a firm and a local political official to explain
these empirical puzzles. Under the current institutional arrangements, resources and
constraints created by the incentive structure of the Cadre Evaluation System (CES)
affect goals and strategies of both local political officials and private investors in that
bargaining relationship. A firm with a high level of Firm Specific Assets (FSAs) may
possess strong post-entry bargaining power, and thus enjoy better protection of the local
official, but a weak firm is vulnerable to the local officials’ predatory activities, and
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therefore needs to rely on other mechanisms, such as their social networks or bribery, to
overcome the commitment problem. In particular, all else being equal, the availability of
an exit option greatly enhances the private firms’ post-entry bargaining power vis-à-vis
local political actors.
In addition, the degree of symbiotic relationship between the local officials and
indigenous private entrepreneurs determines the level of private property protection.
Compared to rotated officials, native local officials have fewer political connections with
higher-level officials and therefore have less chance to be promoted in the power
hierarchy. This condition makes them seek the support of local economic actors for their
political survival. Moreover, native local political leaders who were born in their
jurisdiction have lower transaction costs, and therefore a symbiotic relationship between
native local officials and local private entrepreneurs is feasible. The chances were high
that the native leaders would have close ties to local economic actors and face more strict
social constraints; therefore, they were more likely to protect local property rights.
I statistically test the effects of firms’ characteristics on the security of property
rights using different types of evidence including a nationwide survey data in 2012 and
media reports on government-related property rights expropriation cases. With the proxy
of property rights protection, I also provide systematic empirical evidence from
Guangdong province both cross-sectionally and over time to test the effects of different
types of local political leaders by investigating the characteristics of 203 prefecture-level
political leaders between 1992 and 2008. A detailed case study of local B&B industry
vii

policymaking in Xiamen, Fujian province, utilizing government reports, news reports, as
well as interview notes of fieldwork, further supports the model.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Puzzle of Property Rights Protection in China
Property rights are believed to be a critical factor fostering economic growth (North
1990). And yet, authoritarian governments often have difficulty in making credible
commitments to protect property rights, thus negatively affecting economic development
(Acemoglu et al. 2001; Weingast 1995). Nonetheless, and contrary to conventional
wisdom, China has been able to achieve an economic miracle despite the absence of
credible institutions to protect property rights. The case of China poses an intellectual
puzzle. Private ownership has been increasing dramatically without the rule of law to
overcome the commitment problem. China enacted its first law to explicitly protect
private property in 2007, but the law does not provide enough details or effective
enforcement mechanisms. With one-party communist rule and no independent judicial
system to protect property rights, private investors, especially those indigenous private
entrepreneurs, may appear to be taking a big risk.
To solve the puzzle, several explanations have been offered to account for how
China has been able to overcome its institutional deficiencies and make credible
commitments to investors. Research on property rights in China often resorts to social
networks (Nee and Opper 2012; Wang 2013; Tsai 2002; Wang 2002; Wank 1999), fiscal
federalism (Oi 1999; Qian and Weingast 1997; Weingast 1995), or the personnel control
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system (Li and Zhou 2005). Despite all the efforts, we have little knowledge about why
some private firms enjoy better property rights protection than others under similar
political and economic institutional conditions. Under the incentive structure designed by
the central government, why did some local officials in some localities actively protect
private property rights more than their counterparts hence fostering economic
development?
Instead of looking for reasons of economic growth or China’s economic miracle,
which has been studied extensively by existing literature, this research is interested in the
solutions to overcome the commitment problem in China. I provide a political-economic
explanation that shows some solutions may result from strategic interactions among
political and economic actors at the local level rather than solely as a result of a
commitment device from above. Studying these questions with focus on local institutions
is not to suggest that the central government has lost its imperative grips over economic
matter. Rather, this research is to specify the mechanisms that have fostered the de facto
property rights under political institutions designed by the central government. Local
agents have reached a relatively stable equilibrium under certain conditions and with
various resources.
1.1 Local Officials and Variations in Property Rights Protection
The development of the private sector in China has gone through an uneven path of
institutional and structural changes. From the perspective of local economic actors,
market-oriented policy and 2007 law of property rights are clear signals regarding the
central authority’s commitment for the development of private economy. But with
occasional “left” and “right” ideological swing and no independent judicial system, the
2

government could not make that commitment credible in terms of property rights
protection.
China’s policy was favorable toward Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) not only
because China needs capital, technology, and access to the global market but also
because China wants to show its commitment to be open to the outside world. In this
way, China’s policy toward FDI as a self-enforcing mechanism addresses the
commitment problem.
Less favorable than foreign investors, however, domestic private entrepreneurs have
been facing a more difficult situation in which the commitment problem is the major one.
As with most of China’s economic reforms, policies governing the private sector have
evolved in an experimental, incremental, and sometimes contradictory manner. As a
result, private entrepreneurs can only rely on themselves in protecting their property
rights.
Although there are similar formal institutional arrangements at subnational levels in
China, each locality still enjoys a certain degree of autonomy. Generally, operations of
private firms are embedded in complex local institutions and social networks that affect
the day-to-day interactions between local political actors and private firms. While the
central government has demonstrated their commitment to a market economy and thus
reduced the political risks faced by private firms, local governments often emerge as a
major source of uncertainty for the firms. Moreover, because of the “local autonomy”
nature of the personnel control system and the moral hazard problem inherent in a
principal-agent relationship between different levels of government, whether local
governments play “grabbing hands,” “helping hands,” or “steady hands” really depends
3

on the individual local officials. Without an effective institutional mechanism to tie local
political actors’ hands, private investors would face a significant risk because once their
investments are in place, their bargaining power diminishes, local governments may not
stick to their promises, and local political leaders with their great deal of discretionary
power may pursue their own political and economic goals vis-à-vis the private firms.
1.2 The Theoretical Framework: A Bargaining Game
This research starts from the point that most Chinese local political actors are
supervisors of the governments (both central and local) and simultaneously principal of
their immediate subordinates at lower levels. The most powerful incentive that drives
these local agents is their concern to get more power through promotion in the multilayered power hierarchy. The “competition for promotion” literature assumes that the
primary goal of local political leaders is to be promoted to a higher rank (Li and Zhou
2005). I relax this assumption by including economic interests. The local official is thus
assumed to be an expected utility-maximizer. His/her goals include not only promotion
(career concerns) but also monetary interests. Local political actors’ economic interests
are achieved through the pursuit of political power due to the unique career pattern in
China. Chapter 2 will show three distinct features of the career patterns of political actors
within the Chinese power hierarchy: 1) almost permanent tenure as long as secured in an
office; 2) almost no job options outside the political career once you are in; 3) age limits
for mandatory retirement (Li and Zhou 2005).
As Chapter 2 details, the Cadre Evaluation System (CES) is widely believed to be
an incentive structure designed by the central government to help control local officials in
the administrative hierarchy. It can be used to discipline local party and government
4

leaders and increase their compliance with the policies made by higher-level
governments (O’Brien and Li 1999; Whiting 2001; 2004; Edin 2003; Tsui and Wang
2004; Heimer 2006; Minzner 2009). The CES powerfully shaped the behavior of Chinese
local officials by linking both monetary interests and promotion incentives to their
performance on the tasks listed in the system.
Scholars identify four important factors that determine the prospect of further
promotion of local officials: 1) job performance within the jurisdiction; 2) education; 3)
age; 4) personal ties with one’s superior in charge of promotion. For some scholars, the
first one is one of the most important factors (Li & Zhou 2005), while others argue the
last one (Zhong 2003). One thing worth noting is that local officials will be rewarded
according to how well they meet the standard but rarely be punished (demoted) if they
don’t.1
For building up an effective control and incentive mechanism, term limits and
rotation system were introduced that intends to solve the problem of asymmetric
information, shirking, and monitoring. Both term limits and the cadre rotation system are
expected to serve the purpose of aligning divergent preferences and reducing asymmetric
information. More specifically, the rotation system is expected to prevent tie-cultivation
in the hierarchical power structure and local protectionism (Chen and Zhao 1996;
Blanchard and Shleifer 2001; Zhong 2003).
In discussing the role of local political officials on economic growth, the existing
literature often confuses the goals of local political leaders and that of local government. I
detach political actors from government because the goals of government are not always

1

This is due to the first distinct feature of the career pattern in China administrative hierarchy.
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identical with those of political actors and hence I reconsider the role of local political
leaders on economic development in general and property rights protection in particular.
There are three players in the local economy, Government (G) is the principal, the
local political official serves (S) as the supervisor and the Private entrepreneur (P) is the
agent. In the context of China, I identify political actors as local political leaders,
economic actors as indigenous private entrepreneurs, and government includes central
and local.
I make an extremely simple assumption that the goal of government and political
actors may not be the same. Government (G), both central and local, cares about tax
revenue and the primary and foremost concern of local political leaders (S) is to stay in
office and be promoted to a higher rank. The ultimate goal of local officials, however, is
to acquire more wealth and secure their possessions. In other words, the pursuit of
political power is the means to achieve the end (wealth acquisition). The old saying
“shengguan facai” (more power more money)2 demonstrates the logic of career concerns
with Chinese characteristics. For the indigenous private entrepreneur (P), what he/she
wants is not only to maximize profit but also to secure property rights.
The theoretical literature indicates that the solution to the commitment problem may
result from strategic interactions among political and economic actors rather than solely
as a result of a commitment device (Weimer 2001). Chapter 2 presents a simple
bargaining game between a private firm and a local official following the literature of the
Obsolescing Bargain Model (OBM) and the Political Bargaining Model (PBM), which
explain bargaining relations between a FDI firm and a host country (Vernon 1971; Eden
et al. 2005). Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 discuss in detail the resources and constraints of
2

The old saying Shengguan Facai implies that if the power not for money, why power?
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local political officials under the current personnel control system and private sector
investors, and show how these conditions and constraints determine their bargaining
power in the bargaining process.
I model the relationship as a bargaining game with conflicting goals, and hypothesize
that a firm has strong bargaining power at the time of entry when the local official, under
the pressure of the performance–based evaluation by his or her immediate superiors,
understands that the firm has other options. However, once the firm has made sectorspecific investment, its capability to resist the official’s predatory actions relies upon its
firm-specific characteristics. Chapter 3 identifies the mechanisms that may resolve the
credible commitment problem and shows how the incentive structure designed by the
central government constrains the predatory activities of the local officials in dealing with
private firms with a high level of Firm Specific Assets (FSAs). In this way, the incentive
structure provided by the CES, worked together with the firm-specific characteristics,
results in a stable condition for the protection of property rights. While a firm with a high
level of FSAs may possess strong post-entry bargaining power, and thus enjoy the
protection of the local official, a weak firm has to rely on other mechanisms, such as its
social networks, to overcome the hurdle.
Another equilibrium that emerges from the symbiotic relationship between local
political officials and economic agents, which creates conditions similar to secure
property rights at the local level. The degree of symbiotic relationship between the local
officials and indigenous private entrepreneurs determines the level of private property
protection. Compared to transferred officials, native local officials have fewer political
connections with higher level officials and therefore have less chance to be promoted in
7

the power hierarchy. This condition makes them seek the support of local economic
actors for their political survival. Moreover, native local political leaders who were born
in their jurisdiction have lower transaction costs, and therefore a symbiotic relationship
between native local officials and local private entrepreneurs is feasible and easier. The
chances were high that the native leaders would have close ties to local economic actors
and face more strict social constraints; therefore, they were more likely to protect
property rights.
1.3 What Is Property Rights? An Operational Definition
The term “property rights” has two traditions in the economic literature. One is
defined as the ability to enjoy a piece of property (Alchian 1965, 1987; Cheung 1969).
The other older definition stresses that “what the state assigns to a person” or the
enforcement of rights (Ellickson 1991; Barzel 1997). Barzel calls the first “economic
property rights” and the second “legal property rights.” He argues that “economic rights
are the end (that is, what people ultimately seek), whereas legal rights are the means to
achieve the end” (Barzel 1997: 3).
I use the definition that includes both economic rights and legal rights with focus on
legal rights and the enforcement of rights. This is especially relevant as China is still a
socialist state despite decades of economic reform. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
tried very hard to eliminate private property rights since it seized power in 1949. Before
the Reform era starting in 1978, private property was strictly forbidden. Anyone who ran
a private business would be severely punished, including being arrested and persecuted.
Only in 2007, China enacted its first law to explicitly protect private property rights, but
it still does not provide enough details for the enforcement of the law.
8

There are two theoretical traditions that identify the threat to private property rights.
In the view of Hobbes, the main threat to property rights is from private actors, and
therefore requires strong state institutions as a remedy. Another line of argument lies in
the tradition of Locke, which sees the threat to private property rights within the state
itself, and therefore implies limiting state power to reduce arbitrary behavior in private
property rights. At any rate, preventing the threats from both private actors and the state
requires the rule of law.
In addition, the theoretical literature on the interaction of political and economic
institutions shows that there is an inherent paradox on the interaction between the strong
state and economic development. The problem is that any government strong enough to
specify and protect property rights is also strong enough to seize them for its own benefit
(North and Weingast 1989). How government can provide a credible commitment to its
people is crucial for economic growth to occur in an authoritarian regime. The logic is
that unless the government can provide a credible commitment to the population that it
will not act in its own short-term interests by seizing property, the population will not
invest. If there is no investment, there will be little economic activity, hence no growth.3
In order to generate economic growth, the government must not only establish the set of
rights but also must make a credible commitment to the population.4
The core interest of this research is to identify the mechanisms to overcome the
commitment problem in China. For this purpose, it will focus on the threats from the state
to private property rights. Basically, there are two types of predatory actions that may be

3

Stephen Haber, Razo Armando and Maurer Noel. The Politics of Property Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003), p. 2
4 Douglass North and Barry Weingast, “Constitutions and Commitment: the Evolution of Institutions Governing Public
Choice in Seventeenth-Century England”, The Journal of Economic History, Vol XLIX, Number 4, December 1989.
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taken by the state: direct and indirect taking of property. Direct taking of property can
take various forms, ranging from outright nationalization on a sectoral basis to the seizure
of a firm by the government to outright confiscation of the property (Zheng 2007).5 In the
case of China, indirect expropriations are a common practice manipulated by local
officials, which may involve arbitrary fees and fines collected by local governments, or
even “charitable contributions” to government-sponsored projects (Nee and Opper 2013).
1.4 Research Contributions
It is often argued that countries without the rule of law can rely only on other
mechanisms to overcome the commitment problem. The current literature identifies
several solutions to the credible commitment problem. While the authoritarian system is a
big problem for potential investors who are concerned about political risk, dictators with
a long time-horizon have encompassing interests and therefore may undertake proactive
actions to improve economic institutions in order to raise sustainable tax revenues (Olson
1993; 2000; McGuire and Olson 1996). My study contributes to the literature on how
authoritarian governments may be engaged in institution-building to encourage
investment and hence to promote economic growth (Olson 1993, 2000). In particular, this
research shows how the incentive structure set up by the central government in China
constrains the local officials’ predatory activities in dealing with private firms with an
exit option.
Second, my work is also related to the studies on selective protection of property
rights. Both Greif and Haber et al. show how autocratic rulers enforce property rights
selectively as a private good (Greif 2006; Haber et al. 2003). These rulers used different

5

Zheng (2007) in his study on FDI discusses expropriation and creeping expropriation according to UNCTAD 2003
(p.65).
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strategies, trading the property rights protection of private owners for political support.
Similarly, Robinson (2003) and Treisman (2003) demonstrate how the reformers of
modern Russia, Argentina, and Brazil made similar deals with special interest groups to
promote their reform agendas. Greif (2006) shows how the commitment problem can be
solved through reputation or collective reputation, while Haber et al. (2003) focus on the
third-party enforcement. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) provide other examples and
build a theory of a non-democratic government that is accountable to a selectorate, a
group that has the power to determine the fate of the incumbent. Still other scholars
suggest that political institutions like legislatures, parties, and even elections could work
in a way to “credibly tie the dictator’s hands” against predatory actions, at least against a
small group of elite (Gandhi 2008a; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007).
In this research, I provide evidence for the selective protection of property rights in
another authoritarian regime, China, where the incentive structure designed by the central
government creates conditions for secure property rights. My study reveals that, though
facing the same institutional constraints of the CES, different types of local officials may
act differently in dealing with private investment with dissimilar firm specific
characteristics. Firms with high FSAs may possess strong post-entry bargaining power
over local officials, and thus enjoy better protection of the local officials. Those native
local officials who have less chance to be promoted are more likely in protecting private
property rights, trading the property rights protection for their political survival.
Third, there is heated debate on whether behaviors of Chinese local states are
developmental, corporatists, entrepreneurial, and predatory in terms of economic
development, or whether economic performance results from inter-jurisdictional
11

competition or factional politics at the center (Li and Zhou 2005; Cai and Traisman 2006;
Shih 2004; Shih et al. 2012). This study contributes to the debate by specifying the
conditions under which local officials may play “grabbing hands” (predatory activities),
“helping hands” (developmental orientation) (Shleifer and Vishny 1998), or “steady
hands” (stable and credible protection of property rights). In particular, this research
specifies conditions under which private property rights may be protected in an
authoritarian regime. The study proposes a political-economic explanation of secure
property rights, where the local political leaders protect private rights when symbiosis
between local officials and private entrepreneurs is feasible.
Fourth, in the study of China’s economic development, scholars emphasize China’s
political centralization in reducing risks of local protectionsm and competition for rents
(Blanchard and Shleifer 2000), and central coordination and enforcement capability in
excersing macro-economic control over excessive and destructive local autonomy
(Huang 1996; Li and Lian 1999). My work shows how the discretionary power resulted
by the “local autonomy” feature of the CES led to the positive effects of local
protectionism. Native political leaders tend to protect private property rights because they
have less chances to be promoted in the power hierarchy and need the support from local
economic actors for their political survival.
The study is also related to the literature of evaluating political connections in which
the benefits are captured by economic actors with strong connections with political
leaders (Fisman 2001; Faccio 2006). But this study also stresses the interdependent
relationships between political and economic actors.
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Finally, this research touches on the issue of corruption. Most studies suggest that the
existing corruption levels are detrimental to development (Shleifer and Vishny 1993);
yet, some argue for efficiency-enhancing corruption, the effects of which may be positive
(Leff 1964; Huntington 1968; Li and Wu 2010). Hopefully, this paper will shed some
new light on the coexistence of rapid growth and rising corruption in China (Li and Wu
2010; Wademan 2012). Some studies further distinguish among different types of
corruption (Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Sun 2004; Wedeman 1997; Manion 2014). This
study will emphasize the mutually beneficial exchange nature of corruption.
1.5 Research Design
This research mainly uses sub-provincial level comparisons combining both
qualitative and quantitative approaches. Sub-provincial comparisons can put macro
institutional factors under control. Most studies on the role of local officials focus on
provincial level officials. However, in countries like China there exists vast regional
variation in fiscal arrangement, legal environment, and political and economic conditions.
Therefore, it is not an appropriate context to study the empirical puzzling questions in
this research. Sub-provincial studies in this research can put the institutional
arrangements factor under control.
Sub-provincial level studies will also enable us to see processes such as economic
reform or the cadre evaluation system as shown in this research, often have varied effects
across the territorially-defined subunits of a political system. Studies on China’s
economic development often focus on the variation in economic performance between
provinces, which does not explain the vast intra-provincial variation.
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As for empirical studies, one of the biggest challenges of this research is to gauge
variation in property rights protection in China, as there is not much research available to
refer to and no indicators ready to use. I use arbitrary fees and fines paid by private firms
and collected by the local government as an indicator to measure the degree of property
rights expropriation. Chapter 3 provides discussion to justify the measurement.
I also use private investment in fixed assets as an indicator to measure the security of
property rights. This is a good proxy for the security of property rights because this kind
of investment requires significant immediate costs with only promise of future revenue.
Chapter 4 details the justification of the identification as compared to the common use of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate or GDP per capita measurement in the study
of economic development.
The detailed case study provides additional evidence to support my theory. The
materials of case study are collected from my fieldwork in Xiamen, China from 2014 to
2015. For the basic facts of policymaking case, I use government reports, news reports, as
well as interviews. It is noteworthy that interviews only serve as supplementary sources
of information. The validity and reliability of constructed interviews may be questionable
with its intervening nature, particular when informants consciously and unconsciously
make sense of their research. The examination of media reports and government reports
will help to restore an original context that seeks to make concrete reasons state agents
give for their actions. My interviewees included officials, B&B business owners,
chairmen of B&B associations, journalists, and scholars in Xiamen. To the purpose of
methodological reliability in the interviews, I tried to ask the same questions of different
people to find common answers.
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For the unit of analysis, all the administrators between the central government and
the village level are middle level supervisors, and should be included in the pool of
observations. But for theory building and empirical studies, I locate the research at the
prefecture municipality level. The municipal cities are the third level of China’s political
hierarchy. The top leaders at the municipal city level are the city Party secretary and the
city mayors. This reflects the dual presence of communists Party and government organs
at each level of China’s political hierarchy.
Moreover, officials at various levels of government may behave differently in
accordance with the resources they have in the face of the same incentive structure. For
example, provincial officials are not “local officials” in a strict sense because though
provincial leaders are the local supervisors immediately under the central government,
many of them hold central positions simultaneously, like seating in the Politburo, or the
Central Committee of the CCP. This arrangement demonstrates that they are under tight
political control by the central government and share more common interests with the
Center than lower level officials. Therefore, the behavior patterns of provincial officials
with regards to local economic affairs cannot be applied to lower levels’ officials.
Finally, prefecture-level governments enjoy more discretionary power over local
industry policymaking than county level governments. Also, municipal city leaders have
authority in managing fixed investment, land development, price setting for land lease,
and even tax collection, and therefore enjoy more autonomy than those at lower levels of
authority.
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1.6 The Structure of the Dissertation
In this introductory chapter, I first discuss the empirical puzzle, and then outline the
research question driving this project and offer my theory. I also address the theoretical
contributions of my study and its methodology.
The property rights protection in China to a large degree results from a bargaining
game between private investors and local officials conditioned under the political and
personnel control system. The next chapter provides the theoretical model for arguments
made throughout subsequent chapters. I first briefly review the existing literature on the
Chinese economic miracle and commitment problem. Then I examine the dual nature of
Cadre Evaluation System (CES) and political control system that determine a local
official’s career with a brief review of the competing views on the effects of CES on
economic growth. With their one-sided conclusions, previous studies are unable to tell on
what conditions the CES can provide property rights protection (constrain or induce
property rights predatory behaviors). I suggest a bargaining game under the principalagent model by looking into how the CES shapes the prospect of further promotion of
local officials—the most important incentives of Chinese officials. I conclude this chapter
by arguing that the resources and constraints behind the bargaining power of private
investors and local officials could provide property rights protection from rational choice
perspective.
Chapter 3 discusses the bargaining game between private investors and local officials
with focus on the examination of the private sectors’ resources and argues that a private
firm’s features determine its post-entry bargaining power with local officials and
therefore affect local officials predatory behaviors over private property rights. Finally,
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this chapter provides two types of empirical evidence to test the proposed hypotheses
quantitatively.
Chapter 4 examines the bargaining game under principal-agent model with focus on
local officials’ resources and argues that native local officials with fewer connections and
more constraints have weakened bargaining power in relation to the local private sector
and therefore are more likely in protecting private property rights in exchange for their
support. In other words, all else being equal, native local political leaders who have less
chance to be promoted in the power hierarchy have lower transaction costs, face more
social constraints, and gain extra benefits in establishing symbiotic relationship with local
private entrepreneurs and therefore tend to protect private property rights more than those
transferred ones. This chapter also tests the proposed hypotheses by providing systematic
empirical evidence from Guangdong province both cross-sectionally and over time by
investigating the characteristics of 263 prefecture-level local political leaders between
1992 and 2008, and find that native political leaders promoted substantially higher level
of private investment—the proxy for the protection of private property rights. The results
are robust to various alternative specifications, including a model that accounts for
heterogeneous regional characteristics, initial economic conditions, and socioeconomic
factors.
Chapter 5 studies local industry policymaking in Xiamen. This detailed case study
shows how local industry policymaking affects property rights protection. More
importantly, it examines how policy choices of local officials in consideration of
officials’ promotion endeavor conditioned with their resources (no connection). It
demonstrates that other things being equal, compared with transferred officials, native
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local officials with less resources are more likely to promote private sector hence increase
the level of property rights protection.
In the sixth and concluding chapter, I reiterate my theory of political economy of
property rights with main empirical findings. Then I provide several general conclusions
about property rights in China. Finally, I suggest areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 2
LOCAL OFFICIALS, INCENTIVE STRUCTURE, AND SECURE PROPERTY
RIGHTS
This chapter starts from a brief review of the property rights and commitment problem
and locates the contribution that this research hopes to make to existing literature. I then
provide a game-theoretical explanation under principal-agent framework for arguments
made throughout subsequent chapters by examining the Cadre Evaluation System (ganbu
kaohe zhidu), which determines local officials’ careers through appointment, promotion,
tenure, and removal from the 1980s to present. This is followed by a discussion of term
limits and the rotation system in Chinese bureaucratic system. These systems are very
powerful, because they have shaped local officials’ behaviors, incentives, and ways of
pursuing the benefits contained in the incentive structure. Following the theoretical
framework, I propose a bargaining game between local officials and private investors
under the principal-agent relationships and show how resources and constraints of both
parties have affected the bargaining power, which determines the security of property
rights at local level. The following chapters will be empirical studies and a case study to
test the major hypotheses.
2.1 The Existing Studies of Property Rights
The current literature identifies several solutions to the credible commitment
problem in countries without the rule of law. Theoretically speaking, the authoritarian
system is a big problem for potential investors who are concerned about political risks.
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But dictators with a long time-horizon have incentive to improve economic institutions
for sustainable tax revenues (Olson 1993; 2000; McGuire and Olson 1996). However,
dictators are under constant threats from their challengers and always worry about
immediate political concerns (Svolik 2012; Wintrobe 1998). In the case of China,
political leaders face constant factional power struggle as a result of party-state system
where “collective leadership” rather a single dictator is in charge. Moreover, the
introduction of compulsory retirements in 1980s and the rotation system in 1990s
significantly shorten political leaders’ time-horizon and produced shortsighted behaviors.
Similarly, some scholars suggest that political institutions like legislatures,
parties, and even elections could work in a way to credibly constrain the dictator’s
predatory actions (Gandhi 2008a; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007). The logic is that these
formal institutions can help enhance governance, addressing the commitment problem by
imposing self-constraints. These institutions have been served as political signals making
a credible commitment to potential investors that their investment will not be easily
expropriated one day in the future (Gehlbach and Keefer 2009; Magaloni 2008; Myerson
2008; Svolik 2012). Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) provide other examples and build a
theory of a non-democratic government that is accountable to a selectorate, a small group
that has the power to determine the fate of the incumbent.
However, empirical studies show authoritarian countries with these institutions do
not perform well economically than countries without such institutions (Gandhi 2008b;
Wright 2008). This is especially the case in China, where the Party-state has enjoyed
unprecedented economic growth for the past three decades without the rule of law and
aforementioned institutions. More importantly, China’s contemporary history
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demonstrates no institutions really deter the Party to honor its promises to its supporters
and population as it kept breaking its promises through a series of ideological campaigns.
Another way to solve the credibility problem is to rely on an exogenous
commitment device that raises the costs of expropriation. These mechanisms neither
require the rule of law nor a stable polity. What they require is credible threats of
retaliation by investors (Haber et al. 2003). Scholars show how autocratic rulers enforce
property rights selectively as a private good (Greif 2006; Haber et al. 2003, Robinson
2003; Treisman 2003). Both Robinson (203) and Treisman (2003) illustrate how these
rulers used divide-and-rule strategies, trading the property rights protection of private
owners for political support. Greif (2006) argues how the commitment problem can be
solved through reputation or collective reputation, while Haber et al. (2003) focus on the
third-party enforcement. However, these credible threats may only work in the countries
where the government is weak and unstable. In countries like China, neither intervention,
nor financial hostage, nor the third party can be placed upon it.
As China has achieved the amazing economic miracle for almost four decades,
several explanations have been offered to explain how China has been able to overcome
its institutional deficiencies and make credible commitments to investors. A popular view
is to attribute economic development to market-reform policies and institutional changes
since 1978 (Shirk 1993; Huang 2008). It has been, for example, argued that fiscal
decentralization has created an environment for local governments to protect local
businesses, and hence to promote economic growth. That is, to compete for investment
with other localities, each local government has an incentive to demonstrate credible
commitment to maintaining an environment favorable to economic growth. In other
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words, the competition among local governments for revenue growth could help to limit
government’s predatory behavior in China (Oi 1992; 1999; Montinola et al. 1995; Qian
and Weingast 1997).6
While fiscal decentralization provides useful insights on the commitment problem
in China, it cannot explain why there exists tremendous regional variations in economic
growth. Empirical studies suggest great variations among local governments in their
attitudes towards the private sector, which can be developmental and predatory at the
same time (Blecher and Shue 2001; Saich 2002; Tsai 2003). In particular, these studies
did not elaborate why private entrepreneurs view the political and policy signals as
credible in the face of frequent ideological swing between “socialism” and “capitalism.”
In fact, we have little knowledge about why some private firms enjoy better property
rights protection than others under similar political and economic institutional conditions,
and why some local officials in some localities are more likely than their counterparts to
support the private sector and protect private property rights.
More importantly, fiscal extraction at local levels can be worked in a way of
property rights expropriation by local government. This is especially the case after the
fiscal reform of 1990s, which has greatly weakened local government’s ability to
implement policy tasks set from above (Tao and Yang 2008; Yang 2006). Local
governments are under tremendous pressure and actively pursue extra-budgetary revenue
in the disguise of fees and fines from private sector to satisfy the policy tasks from
higher-level governments due to their limited autonomy in local taxes and revenues for
local development.

6

Qian and Weingast (1997) called this arrangement as Chinese style market-preserving federalism, while Oi (1999)
called the emergence of non-state enterprises as the result of local state corporatism.
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Unlike the top-down perspective, other literature focuses on coping strategies of
the private entrepreneurs or local officials to bypass the restrictions imposed by the
unfavorable formal institutional setting (Tsai 2007), such as “wearing a red hat” by
private firms whereby private businesses disguised themselves as collective firms (Oi and
Walder 1999; Tsai 2007), raising funds via underground finance (Tsai 2002), and
participating in politics to obtain political patronage (Li et al. 2006).
One line of argument focuses on social networks or flexible clientelism that has
been used to substitute for legal protection and to secure business opportunities for
foreign and domestic investors (Wank 1999; Wang 2002; Tsai 2002; Nee and Opper
2012). However, these arguments tend to overemphasize the rent-seeking relationship
between local political actors and private sector actors. In addition, the coping strategies
and informal connections that provide the mechanism to overcome the commitment
problem with regards to private property rights are unstable and may easily fall apart.
Furthermore, these informal coping strategies might have worked in the early years of the
Reform era, but as the Reform has gone deeper, especially the privatization in 1990s and
the clarification and lawmaking of private property rights in 2000s, private firms with
these strategies found themselves in big trouble. Empirical evidence in Chapter 3
demonstrates that “red hat” firms are easily involved in property rights disputes with
local government, and therefore are more vulnerable to government-related property
rights expropriations.
The emerging literature suggests that local governments are not homogenous in
responding to the incentives created by the central government (Whiting 2001; Segal
2003; Donaldson 2011). To explain regional variation, many scholars studied different
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local geographical conditions and other social and cultural features in explaining the vast
variation in local economic performance (Liu 1992; Parris 1993; Forster 1990). However,
these accounts mainly focus on inter-province variation, which cannot explain the vast
intra-provincial variation. Still other researchers emphasize the importance of historical
legacy, such as patterns of state investment inherited from the past (1950-1978), working
together with other institutional and non-institutional factors, in shaping the incentives,
capacities, and constraints of economic actors after 1978 (Qian and Xu 1993; Whiting
2001; Oi 1995; Xu and Zhuang 1998; Yang 1996; Perry and Wong 1985). But this
literature cannot explain variations at the same locality over time. In addition, some
empirical works suggest great variations among local governments with regards to the
private sector, which can be developmental, corporatist, entrepreneurial, and predatory
(Blecher and Shue 2001; Saich 2002; Tsai 2003).
Another influential explanation for inter-provincial variation examines personnel
control systems designed by the central government to direct local government officials
to promote economic growth. Huang (1996) argues that despite economic
decentralization, the central government’s control over personnel allocation plays a
critical role in its ability to control local investment and thus runaway inflation (Huang
1996). This line of empirical work argues that the chances for a provincial leader to be
promoted to a higher-level position are significantly and positively correlated with the
GDP growth rate of the local official’s jurisdiction (Li and Zhou 2005). However, these
findings have been challenged. One group of scholars, for instance, demonstrate that
personal connections associated with factional competition in the central government
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play a critical role in promotion and therefore encourage economic growth in their
jurisdictions (Cai and Traisman 2006; Shih 2004; Shih et al. 2012).
The incentive structure designed by the central government in the CES does play
a role in influencing local officials’ behavior towards economic growth. But the CES
alone does not solve the commitment problem and protect the property rights. This line of
argument assumes that local officials under the CES will automatically protect private
property rights. However, it isn’t necessarily the case. In particular, as this study will
show, local officials under the CES with different resources and constraints may behave
very differently with regards to private sector.
Also, self-interested and promotion-oriented local leaders tend to pursue their
own political goals in addition to the policy targets listed in the CES, taking advantage of
asymmetric information they possess over the upper level governments. To make the
situation even worse, local leaders may collude with private firms at the expense of the
government, as corruption in the form of theft indicates (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993).
More importantly, local officials as individuals may have goals different from
those of the local governments they serve. Under the current institutional arrangements,
local leaders possess a great deal of discretionary power, thus allowing them to pursue
their own political and economic interests strategically in dealing with private
investment. As a result, individual local officials rather than the governments (central or
local) become a major source of uncertainty for private firms in China. Thus, how local
government disciplines and monitors local officials’ behavior becomes a critical issue in
ensuring that local officials will pursue the same goals as those of the local governments.
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2.2 The Nature of the Cadre Evaluation System
The Cadre Evaluation System (CES) is widely believed to be an incentive structure
designed by the central government to help control local officials in the administrative
hierarchy. The CES is one of the most important government personnel control systems
in China. It assesses local party and government leaders based on performance criteria set
by their immediate superior level of government. The CES powerfully shaped the
behavior of Chinese local officials by linking both monetary interests and promotion
incentive to their performance on the tasks listed in the system.
Before the Reform Era, the most important factor that determines Chinese political
actors’ promotion is political royalty or political affinity (Zhong 2003). In addition to
political affinity, three new elements were introduced to the evaluation process since the
Reform Era. Officials have to be of a young age, have good education, and above all,
have the ability to promote local economic growth. The last one has become one of the
most important criteria for higher-level officials to assess the work of their subordinates
(Bo 2002; Huang 1996; Landry 2008; Shih 2004; Li & Zhou 2005).
Also, as the study of factionalism in Chinese politics, social connections are believed
to play a critical role in one’s promotion (Nathan 1973; Dittmer 1995; Zhong 2003; Shih
2004; Bo 2007; Shih et al. 2012). If so, the question then become whether economic
growth still matters for promotion once social connections are account for (Opper and
Brehm 2007; Shih et al. 2012). Some scholar argue that the connections and economic
growth are complements for political leader’s promotion (Jia 2012). At any rate, if a local
leader has social connections with his/her superiors, he/she will become a strong
candidate and his/her promotion prospect will be significantly enhanced. Since political
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affinity is easily to perform and has become less important during the Reform Era, it is
safe to say that four important factors determine the prospect of local officials’
promotion.
The decentralization process of China’s personnel management has transformed
the personnel control system from “two-level down” to “one-level down” administrative
hierarchy. Under the current system, the CES operates in a one-level down fashion
(O’Brien and Li 1999; Landry 2008). That means each level of local government has full
authority to evaluate the leading officials of the immediate subordinate level. For
example, provincial governments have full authority to assess prefectural party
secretaries or mayors without approval from the central organization departments.
Prefectural governments and county governments are authorized to evaluate their
immediate subordinate level of party secretaries and heads of government without
seeking approval from higher-level organization department. Working in this way, the
final decisions are actually made in a centralized way by a handful of people leading the
party committee at each level. Therefore, local political leaders enjoy a great deal of
leeway to pursue their own objectives in appointing local leaders (Wang 2013).
Some scholars argue that the discretion of local leaders is an unintended
consequence of the CES due to conflicting priorities or due to the moral hazard problem
inherent in a principal-agent relationship between central and local governments (Edin
2003; O’Brien and Li 1999; Whiting 2001; 2004). O’Brien and Li’s (1999) study shows
that local officials possess a certain amount of discretionary power to implement policy
selectively in accordance with their own preferences. By studying governments at the
prefecture and county levels, Wang (2013) argues that in addition to the top-down
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control, the CES is also characterized by a high degree of local autonomy that enables
local leaders to bargain with the higher-level government over the specifics of evaluation
standards.
With regards to the commitment problem, the central government has a strong
incentive to keep its promise on private investment, but it is not easy to fulfill the task
without local governments’ compliance. Because local autonomy is inherent in the CES,
local officials have choices to formulate local policies and implement policies selectively
to suit their own goals. Moreover, officials at various levels of government may behave
differently in accordance with the resources they have in the face of the same incentive
structure.
2.3 Term Limits and Rotation System
In addition to the CES, two more systems have been introduced to be a
mechanism in shaping incentives, capacities, and constraints of local political officials.
Since the 1990s, China has developed a control system that intends to solve the problem
of asymmetric information, shirking, and monitoring. Both term limits and the cadre
rotation system are expected to serve the purpose of aligning divergent preferences and
reducing asymmetric information. The two systems largely shorten the career horizon of
local leaders and many economic targets are often out of control of the local officials, and
the provision of local public goods has reinforced the revenue extraction pressure facing
local leaders.7
The system of compulsory retirements was introduced in 1982. The main feature
of the system is to set the age limits to retirement for local officials. The practice on
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mandatory stepping down at age 65 for provincial governors was established. A recent
policy regulates that for a provincial party secretary, if he/she ends up at the age 63 after
a five year term, he/she would not be allowed to serve another round. Mayors of
prefectures are usually required to retire at the age of 60. Under this system, young and
well-educated officials are favored for further promotion.8
The rotation system was originally to rotate provincial officials across provinces
and positions beginning in 1990. For some reasons, there was a different policy before
1990, which encouraged localization of governors (Zhang and Gao 2008).9 More
specifically, the rotation system is expected to prevent tie-cultivation in the hierarchical
power structure and local protectionism (Chen and Zhao 1996; Blanchard and Shleifer
2001; Zhong 2003). Those who support the rotation system argue that the system reduces
corruption and faction formation in local governments (Chen and Zhao 1996) and
promotes regional economic development (Liu 1998; Pu 1999). Others are skeptical by
focusing on the negative effect of shortsighted rotated officials on local economic
development (Gu 2006). The empirical study suggests the positive impact of rotated
governors on local economic growth in the eastern provinces (Zhang and Gao 2008).
There are no uniform rules on which who should be included in the rotation
system. However, it is discouraged that the key local officials, mostly the “first hand”—
the Party secretary, “at the provincial and prefecture levels serve in his or her native
province and prefecture (Zhong 2003, p. 118).”10 Right now, the governments both
central and provincial have sped up rotating local officials between localities in order to

8

By the current retirement regulations, if someone cannot be climb to the seat of mayor at 55, his/her further promotion
prospect is very unlikely.
9 See Zhang and Gao (2008) for details.
10 See Zhong (2003) for details.
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prevent intense tie-cultivation and local protectionism. This system has reinforced the
short-time pressure for local officials to generate impressive economic growth in only 2
to 3 years, so as to impress their superiors to win promotion.
The local officials face great pressure and incentive to satisfy the policy targets
assigned by upper level government. This situation on the one hand does motivate better
performance from the local officials, which helps to explain the rapid growth in the past
to a large degree. But the pressures also produce other unintended consequences from
them. Shorter time-horizon in each locality also causes short-term behaviors of local
officials eager for instant success. Chapter 5 details that local leaders are fanatic in the so
called “achievement projects,” like investing in a symbolic project in the city at the cost
of hurting private sector.
In summary, the CES worked with the term limits system has created a distinct
career pattern in China’s power hierarchy. First, unlike politicians in democratic regimes,
in the case of China, once a person becomes a cadre, he/she will enjoy cadre status until
retirement. He loses his position only when he gives up voluntarily, or becomes a
convicted felon. Therefore, no mater what job performance he achieved, his position is
secured as long as he got there. It is very rare to demote an official because he/she did not
meet the targets assigned by the upper level government. Second, because of the almost
permanent tenure in an office, there are almost no job options outside the political career
once you are in (Li and Zhou 2005). Finally, the age limits have been set to compulsory
retirement for local officials.
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2.4 The Theoretical Framework
In this section, I present a simple bargaining game between a private firm and a local
official following the literature of the Obsolescing Bargain Model (OBM) and the
Political Bargaining Model (PBM), which explain bargaining relations between a Foreign
Direct Investment (FDI) firm and a host country (Vernon 1971; Eden et al. 2005). The
major concerns of the multinational corporations’ (MNCs) investment decisions in a
developing country include the returns on an investment and the political risk associated
with it. One of the risks as shown in the Obsolescing Bargain Model is that the initial
bargain favors the foreign investors, but the bargaining power shifts from MNCs to the
host countries once the investment is in place. The host governments have incentives to
impose higher taxes to squeeze FDI firms’ profits or expropriate their assets completely
by changing policies at any time. The possibility of direct or indirect expropriation is
often the major political risk for MNCs investing in an authoritarian regime.
Private firms in China face similar risks as MNCs do in their investment decisions.
More importantly, in the case of China, domestic private enterprises are the most
vulnerable in terms of property rights protection as compared to the state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) since the central government
sets up a package of preferential policies exclusively for the latter types of firms. As
discussed in the previous sections, individual local officials rather than the government
(central or local) become a major source of uncertainty for private firms in China. Under
the current institutional arrangement, local political leaders possess a great deal of
discretionary power, allowing them to pursue their own political and economic interests
strategically in regard to private investment.
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Before formalizing the bargaining game and the symbiotic logic of secure
property rights, I identify the players and their preferences as follows. There are three
players in the local economy, Government (G) is the principal, the local political official
serves (S) as the supervisor and the Private entrepreneur (P) is the agent. I detach political
actors from government because the goals of government are not always identical with
political actors. In the context of China, I identify political actors as local political
leaders, economic actors as indigenous private entrepreneurs, and government includes
central and local.
I make an extremely simple assumption that the goal of government and political
actors may not be the same. Government (G), both central and local, cares about tax
revenue and the primary and foremost concern of local political leaders (S) is to stay in
office and be promoted to a higher rank. The ultimate goal of local officials, however, is
to acquire more wealth and secure their possessions. In other words, the pursuit of
political power is the means to achieve the end (wealth acquisition). The old saying
“shengguan facai” (more power more money)11 demonstrates the logic of career concerns
with Chinese characteristics. For the indigenous private entrepreneur (P), what he/she
wants is not only to maximize profit but also to secure property rights.
There exist nested games between the three players in the local economy. The
principal-agent problem is inherent between different levels of government, as well as
between governments, both central and local, and local officials. It is assumed that there
exist information asymmetries between the government, local political leaders, and
economic actors. In other words, the activities of local political leaders and economic
actors cannot be observed by the government, and indigenous private entrepreneurs
11

The old saying Shengguan Facai implies that if the power not for money, why power?
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cannot perfectly monitor the impact of the government’s actions or policies upon their
property rights. As Figure 2.1 shows, local political leaders engage in the bargaining
game with indigenous private investors within the principal-agent relationships between
the government and local leaders, and upper level leaders and lower level leaders.
The third assumption I make is that indigenous private entrepreneurs do not
necessarily demand efficient property rights. In fact, it is not clear that an individual
private entrepreneur should always demand that the government protect everyone’s
property rights. According to Haber et al. (2003), an indigenous private entrepreneur can
receive utility from the secure and efficient property rights, because this makes her asset
more liquid, and therefore more valuable. However, if selective enforcement grant the
indigenous private entrepreneur more comparative advantage in the market, then it may
be more profitable to demand less than universal enforcement. Between these two
possibilities, it is assumed that indigenous private entrepreneurs care first and foremost
about their own property rights. Any profit-maximizing actor would readily accept the
exclusive protection of her property rights, providing that it produced better benefits to
that actor.
Finally, the model assumes that local officials are potential predators and private
investors are their prey. The predator and prey interact strategically in the context in
which the central government or superiors level officials evaluate the subordinate local
officials on the basis of the cadre performance evaluation system.
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Party secretary &
Mayors

Private Investors
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1.Profits
2.Property rights
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1.Promotion
2.Wealth

Resources
1. connections
2. young
3. well educated

Resources
1.employment
2.export market
3. technology

Constraints
1.performance
2.age limits
3.no connections

Constraints
1.resource seeking
2.domestic market

Figure 2.1 A Bargaining Game under the Principal-Agent Relationships

To provide a systematic understanding of the bargaining process between local
political actors and private sector investors, I will first describe local political actors’
goals and their resources as well as the constraints under the current personnel control
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systems. Then, I will discuss private sector investors’ goals and resources in the
bargaining game with local political leaders. Finally, I delineate the bargaining process
between local political actors and private sector investors, and propose theoretical
hypotheses.
The local political officials’ goals, resources, and constraints
While both central and local governments hope to accomplish broad social,
economic and political objectives, local political leaders, in direct contact with private
firms, may intend to achieve their personal goals through bargaining with private
investors. One of the major goals of the government at both central and local levels is to
attract investments, which will generate GDP growth rate, tax revenue, and employment.
But for many local political leaders, other goals may be involved in dealing with private
investment.
The “competition for promotion” literature assumes that the primary goal of local
political leaders is to be promoted to a higher rank (Li and Zhou 2005). I relax this
assumption by including economic interests. The local official is thus assumed to be an
expected utility-maximizer. His/her goals include not only promotion (career concerns)
but also monetary interests.
Although it may be clear that the CES plays a significant role in forming a local
political leader’s preferences, an individual’s background and resources influence his/her
goals and strategies toward private investment. As discussed in the previous section, three
elements are important for local officials to be promoted to a higher rank: youth,
education, and the ability to promote economic growth. Youth became a critical factor in
determining one’s political career when the age-based mandatory retirement rule was
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implemented in 1982. So if a local leader is near retirement age, then he/she will have
nearly zero chance to be promoted despite his/her expertise in local economic growth. As
a result, his goal towards private investment will not be the same as the goals of those
who are young and/or well-educated. Quite likely, the near-retiring officials may be more
interested in monetary fortunes than in prospects for promotion.
Also, as discussed in previous sections, according to career concern studies, it is
not clear whether job performance measured by GDP growth rate, political connections,
or a mix of performance and connections matters most for one’s promotion. From the
perspective of “faction politics”, those who have connections with provincial leaders, will
be promoted no matter what job performance they achieved. For those who don’t, there
are several strategies to maximize their likelihood of promotion, such as bribery to their
superior or simply buy an office (Zhu 2008). Chapter 4 will show how these resources
and constraints affect local officials’ behaviors in the bargaining relationship with
indigenous private investors.
Private investors’ goals, resources, and constraints
Private firms in China are more vulnerable than the State-Owned Enterprises
(SOEs) and Foreign Invested Enterprises (FIEs). The development of the private sector in
China went through an uneven path of institutional and structural changes. Before 1978,
private businesses were strictly forbidden. Anyone who ran a private business would be
severely punished, including being arrested and persecuted. Between 1978 and 1988, the
private sector was not allowed officially except for “individual entrepreneurs” (getihu)
engaging in small businesses with less than eight employees. The 1988 regulations
allowed businesses with more than eight employees to be registered as “private
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enterprise” (siying qiye), but the Tiananmen Incident of 1989 dashed the inception of
private businesses. Deng Xiaoping’s “Southern Tour Talk” in early 1992 and the
introduction of the Company Law in 1993 reignited and accelerated the development of
the private sector during the 1990’s. However, discrimination against the private sector
continued until the 1999 Constitutional Amendments accorded private enterprises legal
status. It was only after the 2004 Constitutional Amendments that lawful private property
was protected and equal legal status was offered for private firms and state-owned
enterprises. In 2007, China enacted its first law to explicitly protect private property, but
it does not provide enough details or effective enforcement mechanisms.
The major goal of a private sector investor is to secure business opportunities and
make profits. But if the profits will be expropriated by the government, investors will not
invest. Therefore, the security of property rights is also under consideration. In general,
private sector investor’s choice to invest in a particular place is determined by a variety
of objectives and considerations. Business opportunities, market expansion, social
networks, tax incentives, fiscal subsidies, cheap land, labor force, and legal environment
are all factors that private investors will take into account in their investment decisions.
Which factor is weighted more heavily than others depends very much upon post-entry
bargaining power, referring to the relative bargaining power vis-à-vis the local
government after the investment is made. And a private sector investor’s post-entry
bargaining power is in turn determined by firm specific characteristics and the degree to
which he/she will need from the local government, such as licensing requirements,
permissions, resources, domestic market, and public-goods provisions.
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The literature on international business shows that firm-specific advantages affect
multinational corporations’ investment decisions in different host countries (Helpman
1984; Markusen 2002; Hansen et al. 2005; Zheng 2007). In particular, the OBM literature
indicates that OBM may only be applied to the natural resources sector such as copper
mining and the oil industry (Vernon 1971; Gilpin 1975), while manufacturing industries
may be less vulnerable to the risk of expropriation because of their ability to adjust to the
local environment and to renew production technologies to balance against the erosion of
bargaining power. Some scholars find that the multinational corporation’s bargaining
power with the host country does not obsolesce for the high technology sector (Kobrin
1987), while others suggest that in some capital-intensive manufacturing such as the
automobile industry, a firm’s ability to establish an industry cluster and its technological
assets could enhance its bargaining power (Bennett and Sharpe 1979).
As the critics of OBM question the usefulness of the model, scholars propose the
political bargaining model (PBM) to revitalize OBM by incorporating post-entry political
strategies with host government through iterative bargaining (Eden et al. 2005). The
PBM argues that the competitive advantage of MNCs comes from their Firm Specific
Assets (FSAs) or resources “if they are rare, hard to imitate, have no direct substitutes,
and enable companies to pursue opportunities or avoid threats” (Eden et al. 2005, p. 12).
In the case of China, as a general rule, labor-intensive, export-oriented
manufacturing firms and high technology firms enjoy competitive advantage, while
resource-intensive and local market seeking firms are in a disadvantageous position in
bargaining with local governments. I will come back to this point and discuss firms’
characteristics extensively in Chapter 3.
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2.5 The Bargaining Game
Initially, the relative bargaining power favors private investors vis-à-vis local
officials because, first, local officials are trying to attract investment under the pressure of
the performance-based evaluation, and second, investors may have other options even for
resource-intensive firms. After a decision is made, the relative bargaining power may
shift. That is, once an investor has made firm-specific investment in a locality, his/her
resources may be held hostage by an opportunistic local official. The local government
would then be in a position to impose new requirements on the firm, which might more
than offset the initial incentives. Moreover, in the context of China, private entrepreneurs
risk not only outright expropriation but also a host of other predatory actions taken by the
local government in the guise of fines, taxes, and/or “charitable contributions” to
government-sponsored projects (Nee and Opper 2012).
However, if a private investor’s post-entry bargaining power is strong, he/she will be
able to protect his/her bargains. The degree to which the investor will be able to do so
depends on the level of Firm Specific Assets (FSAs) and the degree to which he/she will
need from the local government for, say, licensing, permissions, resources, and publicgoods provisions. In particular, private firms with an exit option will enjoy sufficient
protection because they possess high levels of FSAs. The outright expropriation of this
type of firm does no good to the government or to the local political leaders. Political and
social considerations at both central and local governments with the incentive structure
embedded in the CES have thus set up relatively stable conditions for these types of
investment, which appears to facilitate a self-enforcing solution to the commitment
problem. In this situation, everyone benefits and no one has the incentive to deviate.
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On the one hand, both central and local governments have strong incentives to keep
their promises since these firms can generate higher GDP growth, tax revenue, and
employment. Although private firms in general may have an incentive to conceal real
profits and hence decrease the taxes they pay to the government, it is more difficult for
labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms and high technology firms to do so.
On the other hand, due to relatively short tenure in office (e.g., less than three years,
on average, for local mayors), local officials are under enormous pressure to show their
ability to produce economic growth quickly (Pei 2012). Thus, local political leaders have
strong incentives to maintain a collaborative relationship with these firms because it is an
easy way to demonstrate their job performance. Also, knowing that this type of firm has
an exit option even if it is expensive for them to do so, and that the worst scenario of
resistance to predatory actions will severely damage their reputation, local political actors
will restraint their predatory behavior.
For investors with rapidly obsolescing post-entry bargaining power, however, there
is no self-enforcing commitment. Private firms without an exit option such as resourceintensive and local market seeking firms are in a disadvantageous position to overcome
the commitment problem. This type of firms’ FSAs is low as its firm-specific assets are
common, easy to be imitated and substituted, and hard to transfer. They need more
government-related resources for their projects. Investors may prefer a better legal
environment to constrain the predatory activities or rely on personal networks (guanxi) or
bribing local officials to protect their investments.
For local officials, the political risk of direct expropriation of private firms without
an exit option may be low due to the moral hazard problem. For instance, the predatory
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actions may not be seen as personal. It may be done in the name of the local government.
In addition, a local official could assign his/her protégé to take over the firm and to run
the business as usual. After the outright expropriation, the local government still retains
GDP growth, tax revenue and employment opportunities. Moreover, the local official
receives private benefits from the outright expropriation as well. No matter who is going
to take over the firm, the new owner will owe a favor to the official, and will pay back in
some form of revenue. Therefore, private investors who engage in low-level FSAs
investments without an exit option will, from time to time, rely on their personal
networks (guanxi) or bribery to protect their property rights.
If the local official chooses not to expropriate directly but to be engaged in indirect
expropriation such as collecting fees, fines, forced apportionment of funds (tanpai), or
forced contribution of government sponsored projects, the firm with no exit option has
little bargaining power and has no choice but to give in with either direct payments or
bribes. In this case, the local official receives both higher merit and private benefits with
no risk of the exit of the firm. Chapter 3 presents the model that illustrates the prisoner’s
dilemma situation in the bargaining relationship between local officials and private
investors, and test the hypotheses statistically.
Local political leaders’ decision of whether or not prey on the private sector is
determined by a firm’s resources and constraints. However, as discussed in previous
section, local officials are also under strict constraints within the personnel control
systems. If the local official is near 55, or less educated, or has no political connections,
he/she will desperately need the private sector’s support for political survival. This
symbiotic relationship between native local political officials and private entrepreneurs
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creates conditions similar to secure property rights at the local level. The degree of
symbiotic relationship between the local officials and indigenous private entrepreneurs
determines the level of private property rights protection.
Native local officials have lower transaction costs and therefore a symbiotic
relationship between native local officials and local private firms is easier. Compared to
rotated local leaders, native local political leaders have more incentives to protect private
property rights in order to get political and economic benefits as well as none-material
rewards. I will show how these resources and constraints created by the political control
systems affect local officials’ behaviors in the bargaining relationship with indigenous
private investors and test the hypothesis in Chapter 4.
2.6 Summary
This chapter briefly reviews the existing studies of property rights with special
attention on the personnel control systems including the cadre evaluation system, term
limits, and rotation system, and provides a game theoretical explanation to the property
rights protection in China. I theorize the endogenous property rights as a bargaining game
between a private investor and a local official. Resources and constraints of both actors
affect their bargaining power in the bargaining relationship and hence determine the level
of property rights protection. Private firms with high levels of FSAs and especially with
an exit option possess strong post-entry bargaining power, and thus enjoy better property
rights protection, but weak firms are vulnerable to the local officials’ predatory activities,
and therefore needs to rely upon other mechanism, such as their social networks or
bribery, to overcome the commitment problem.
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Another source that could overcome the commitment problem emerges from the
symbiotic relationship between the local officials and indigenous entrepreneurs. Native
local political actors, who are less favorable to the promotion prospect, are more likely to
protect private property rights. The logic is that compared to transferred officials, native
local officials have fewer political connections with higher-level officials and therefore
have less chance to be promoted in the power hierarchy. This condition makes them seek
the support of local economic actors for their political survival. Moreover, native local
political leaders who were born in their jurisdiction have lower transaction costs, and
therefore a symbiotic relationship between native local officials and local private
entrepreneurs is feasible. The chances were high that the native leaders would have close
ties to local economic actors and face more strict social constraints; therefore, they were
more likely to protect local property rights.

43

CHAPTER 3
THE GAME OF PROPERTY RIGHTS: CREDIBLE COMMITMENT IN CHINA
This chapter explores the resources and constraints of private firms under the institutional
arrangements by examining the firms’ characteristics. According to the theoretical
framework presented in Chapter 2, these conditions will determine the bargaining power
in the bargaining relationship with local officials in terms of property rights protection.
Then, I test the effects of firms’ characteristics on the security of private property rights
quantitatively.
As discussed in Chapter 2, I theorize the endogenous property rights as a
bargaining game between a private firm and a local political actor. I model the
relationship as a one-shot game with conflicting goals, and hypothesize that a firm is in a
strong bargaining position at the time of entry when the local official, under the pressure
of the performance–based evaluation by his or her immediate superiors, understands that
the firm has other options. However, once the firm has made sector-specific investment,
its capability to resist the official’s predatory actions relies upon certain firm-specific
characteristics. More specifically, in the post-entry situation, the availability or
unavailability of an exit option for a private firm affects the local political actor’s
behavior with regard to the protection of private property rights. These hypotheses are
supported by a statistical analysis of a nationwide firm-level survey on privately owned
enterprises and the data I collected from the media reports of government-related
property rights expropriation cases.
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The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a
close examination of firms’ resources and constraints created by their characteristics
under the current institutional arrangements. Section 2 provides a simple bargaining game
between a private firm and a local official with hypotheses that guide the empirical
analysis. Then, I present a model that illustrates the dominant strategies for different
types of private firms and local officials. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 discusses
the research design and provides empirical tests. Section 6 presents the analysis of media
reports of government-related property rights expropriation cases. Section 7 concludes.
3.1 Firms’ Characteristics as a Source of Property Rights Protection
As the discussion of the Cadre Evaluation System (CES) demonstrates, local
officials are under the pressure of the performance–based evaluation by their immediate
superiors. They have to show their ability to accomplish the tasks listed in CES, which
include Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate, employment creation, and tax
revenue. Labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms and high technology firms
can create more jobs, contribute stable fiscal revenue, and generate higher economic
growth. All of these are major political tasks on the basis of which local political officials’
job performance is evaluated. If these firms choose to relocate their investment elsewhere,
local governments will lose all the benefits they can get, and local political leaders will
also fail in cadre evaluation which is closely tied to their future career. As one of the
fallen local political leaders in Southern China bitterly complains, “Some firms always
threaten to relocate their headquarters. Let them leave. See if they could move to
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heaven.”12 Indeed, the availability of an exit option, even if unused, can be a powerful
tool that greatly enhances a private firm’s bargaining power vis-à-vis local political actors.
Labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms even in the period of labor
shortage can retain their advantage. For example, many Chinese factories have struggled
to find enough people to operate the assembly lines since the labor shortage first occurred
in 2004. Labor shortage was so acute in 2012 that it forced many firms to turn to the local
government for help. However, this does not seem to decrease the bargaining power of
these private sector actors vis-à-vis the local governments. Rather, in order to attract and
retain the investment, many local governments promise to help to recruit workers for
them (Lin 2013).13
However, if labor-intensive firms in resource-intensive and local market seeking
sectors, such as mining industry, or steel industry, even if they generate the same benefits
for local governments as the above-mentioned labor-intensive, export-oriented
manufacturing firms do, they may lose their advantage. The key factor is that these firms
have no option to relocate their businesses. If they choose to exit, they will lose all.
Like labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms, resource-intensive and
local market seeking firms can contribute to employment creation, fiscal revenue, and
economic growth. But this type of firms relies heavily on government-related resources.
More importantly, without an exit option, local political actors may gain more bargaining
power over private firms in protecting their properties. Knowing that these firms have no
place to relocate their investment, local political actors tend to prey on them as compared
to those firms with an exit option.
12

See http://news.xinhuanet.com/lianzheng/2014-07/03/c_126703996.htm (accessed July 17,2014).
Lin Liyao, “Migrant Worker Shortage Intensifies,” http://www.china.org.cn/china/201311/12/content_30574062.htm
13
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Traditionally, capital-intensive firms are vulnerable to political risks because
these firms involve a large amount of capital for machinery and infrastructure, and
therefore need longer time to make a profit. But if these capital-intensive firms are in
labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing sector or high technology sector so as to
provide them with an exit option, they will be able to retain their advantage. If capitalintensive firms are in resource-intensive sectors, such as oil industry, energy industry, or
real estate industry, which leave them no option to exit, they will lose their advantage.
In summary, firms with resources that are hard to substitute in regard to skilled
labor force, access to foreign market, or technology know-how are considered to be highlevel Firm Specific Assets (FSAs) firms, and will be in a better position to bargain with
the government. In particular, it is the availability of an exit option that, to a large extent,
determines the post-entry bargaining power of private sector actors over local political
actors in protecting their property rights.
3.2 A Bargaining Game
As discussed in Chapter 2, the relative bargaining power at the time of entry
favors private investors vis-à-vis local officials because, first, local officials are trying to
attract investment under the pressure of the performance-based evaluation, and second,
investors may have other options even for resource-intensive firms. However, once an
investor has made firm-specific investment in a locality, the relative bargaining power
may shift to local officials. In the post-entry situation, his/her investment may be held
hostage by an opportunistic local official. The local government would then take
advantage of it so as to impose new requirements on the firm, which might more than
offset the initial incentives. Moreover, in the context of China, private entrepreneurs risk
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not only outright expropriation but also a host of other predatory actions taken by the
local government in the guise of fines, taxes, and/or “charitable contributions” to
government-sponsored projects (Nee and Opper 2012).
However, a firm’s specific characteristics can greatly empower its bargaining
power, and if a private investor’s post-entry bargaining power is strong, he/she will be
able to protect his/her bargains. The degree to which the investor will be able to resist
local officials’ predatory actions depends on the level of Firm Specific Assets (FSAs) and
the degree he/she will need from the local government for, say, licensing, permissions,
resources, and public-goods provisions.
As discussed in previous section, private firms with an exit option will enjoy
sufficient protection because they possess high levels of FSAs. The outright
expropriation of this type of firm will hurt the government or affect the local political
leaders negatively in terms of performance based evaluation measured by real figures like
tax revenue, employment creation, and GDP growth rate. Political and social
considerations at both central and local governments with the incentive structure
embedded in the CES have thus created relatively stable conditions for these types of
investment, which appears to facilitate a self-enforcing solution to the commitment
problem. In this situation, everyone benefits and no one has the incentive to deviate.
Governments, both central and local, have strong incentives to keep their
promises since these firms can generate higher GDP growth, tax revenue, and
employment. Although private firms in general may have an incentive to conceal real
profits and hence decrease the taxes they pay to the government, it is more difficult for
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high level FSAs firms, such as labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms and
high technology firms to do so.
For local officials, due to relatively short tenure in office (e.g., less than three
years, on average, for local mayors), they are under enormous pressure to show their
ability to produce economic growth quickly (Pei 2012). Thus, local political leaders have
strong incentives to maintain a collaborative relationship with these firms because it is an
easy way to demonstrate their job performance. Also, knowing that this type of firm has
an exit option even if it is expensive for them to do so, and that the worst scenario of
resistance to predatory actions will severely damage their reputation, local political actors
will restrain their predatory behaviors.
However, there is no self-enforcing commitment for investors with rapidly
obsolescing post-entry bargaining power. Private firms without an exit option, such as
resource-intensive and local market seeking firms, are in a disadvantageous position to
overcome the commitment problem. This type of firm’s FSAs is low as its firm-specific
assets are common, easy to be imitated and substituted, and hard to transfer. They need
more government-related resources for their projects. Investors may prefer a better legal
environment to constrain the predatory activities or rely on personal networks (guanxi) or
bribing local officials to protect their investments.
More importantly, for local officials, the political risk of direct expropriation of
private firms without an exit option may be low due to the moral hazard problem. For
instance, the predatory actions may not be seen as personal responsibility. It may be done
in the name of the local government. In addition, a local official could assign his/her
protégé to take over the firm and to run the business as usual. After the outright
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expropriation, the local government still retains GDP growth, tax revenue and
employment opportunities. Moreover, the local official receives private benefits from the
outright expropriation as well. No matter who is going to take over the firm, the new
owner will owe a favor to the official, and will pay back in some form of revenue.
Therefore, private investors who engage in low-level FSA investments without an exit
option will, from time to time, rely on their personal networks (guanxi) or bribery to
protect their property rights.
If the local official chooses not to expropriate directly but to be engaged in
indirect expropriation, such as collecting fees, fines, forced apportionment of funds
(tanpai), or forced contribution of government sponsored projects, the firm with no exit
option has little bargaining power and has no choice but to give in with either direct
payments or bribes. In this case, the local official receives both higher merit and private
benefits with no risk of the exit of the firm.
Given the above discussion, I come up with two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: All else being equal, private firms with an exit option and high
level of FSAs enjoy sufficient property rights protection.
Hypothesis 2: All else being equal, private firms with no exit option and low
level of FSAs are vulnerable to local officials’ predatory activities.
3.3 The Model
As noted earlier, the situation in which a resource-intensive and local market
seeking firm on the one hand, or a labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firm or
a high technology firm on the other may find itself being treated differently. The major
difference between the two lies in the fact that the former does not have an exit option
while the latter does. The situations can be illustrated by the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.
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The traditional prisoner’s dilemma is a game that shows why two purely
“rational” individuals might not cooperate, even if it is in their mutual interests to do so.
In the one-shot game, a private investor and a local official may find themselves in a
situation very much like the prisoner’s dilemma. Table 3.1 shows the two players’ payoff
matrix. By cooperate, I mean actors play by the rules. Defect means actors evade the
rules. In this case, for the firm, evading the rules means the firm conceal real profits so
that decreases the taxes it pays to the government, as well as it decides to relocate its
assets. For the local official, evading the rules means he/she preys on the firm ranging
from outright taking of investment to arbitrary fees and fines collected by the
government, or forced “charitable contributions” to the government projects.
Table 3.1 Payoffs of a Private Firm and a Local Official in a One-shot Game
A local official
A private firm

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

Defect

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

B1, B2

D1, A2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

A1, D2

C1, C2

3.1 The situation involving a private firm with low level of FSAs and no exit option
Scenario 1:
In this scenario, suppose that both the firm and the local official choose to comply
with the rules—explicit or implicit—governing normal market transactions. Then, the
payoffs of the two players in a one-shot game are as follows. The firm will get net profit
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B1 after deducting the cost and tax paid to the governments. The local official will get the
bundle benefits B2 he/she intends to achieve as an official including the policy tasks such
as GDP growth rate, tax revenue, and employment creation, assigned by higher
governments for the political survival and the monetary interests consist of wages and
pensions.
Scenario 2:
In scenario 2, suppose that the firm complies with the rules, but the local official
decides to exploit. The payoffs change to as follows. The firm will get D1, in which net
profit deducts the loss of property exploited by the local official ranging from part of the
expected profit to all of the investment as well as many types of fees, fines, and
“contributions.” The local official will get A2 that includes the bundle benefits plus the
benefits from the exploitation and deducting the cost of the probability of being caught
for any wrongdoings with a penalty. Generally, the probability of being caught is very
small. And the predatory action is often done in the name of the government or the
“public.” Thus, there is also a moral hazard problem.
Scenario 3:
Scenario 3 is the situation in which the firm tries to evade while the local official
decides to abide by the rules. The payoffs thus become as follows. The firm will get A1
that includes net profit plus the extra benefits for evading the rules, and deducts the cost
of the probability of being caught with a penalty. The local official will get D2, in which
the bundle benefits deduct the loss of tax revenue and other benefits as a consequence of
the firm’s choice.
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Scenario 4:
In scenario 4, suppose that both the firm and the local official choose not to
comply with the rules. The payoffs may then turn out to be as follows. The firm will get
C1, in which the net profit deducts the loss of property exploited by the local official plus
the extra benefits for evading the rules, and deducts the cost of the probability of being
caught with a penalty. The local official will get C2, in which the bundle benefits plus the
benefits from exploitation for the firm, and deduct the loss of tax revenue and other
benefits as a consequence of the firm’s choice and the cost of the probability of being
caught with a penalty.
The payoff relationship is as following:
A>B>C>D
Therefore, each player has a dominant strategy, and the game has an obvious
solution as follows.
For the firm, scenario 3 is better than scenario 1 if the extra benefits for evading
the rules deduct the cost of the probability of being caught with a penalty is bigger than 0.
Scenario 4 is better than scenario 2 if the extra benefits for evading the rules deduct the
cost of the probability of being caught with a penalty is bigger than 0. The strategic
choice made by the firm would be this:
scenario 3> scenario 1> scenario 4> scenario 2
For the local official, scenario 2 is better than scenario 1 if the benefits from
exploitation for the firm deduct the cost of the probability of being caught for any
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wrongdoings with a penalty is bigger than 0. Scenario 4 is better than scenario 3 if the
benefits from exploitation for the firm deduct the cost of the probability of being caught
for any wrongdoings with a penalty is bigger than 0. The strategic choice made by the
local official would be this:
scenario 2> scenario 1> scenario 4> scenario 3
Thus, if the chances of being caught are sufficiently small, both the firm and the
local official will choose the dominant strategy that is to evade the rules in the one-shot
game, and therefore end up in scenario 4. This is a prisoners’ dilemma game. Clearly, in
the payoff relationship A>D, scenario 1 is better than scenario 4.
Given that the probability of being caught for the firm is bigger than the firm’s
extra benefits for evading the rules deducting the level of exploitation by the local official
and the probability of being caught for the local official is bigger than benefits from
exploitation for local official deducting the loss of tax revenue and other benefits as a
consequence of the firm’s choice, or chances of being caught are sufficiently high, the
choice of complying with the rules by both players will be the “common interest.” Then,
in an infinitely repeated version of the game, the “common interest” may be realized if
both players choose to play, for example, a trigger strategy.
3.2 The situation involving a private firm with high level of FSAs and an exit option
This game is similar to the previous one except that the firm has an exit option,
that is, as the exploitation becomes intolerable, the firm may opt to leave the market so as
to minimize the costs. Thus, we need to add additional terms in the payoffs for each
player under the second and fourth scenarios mentioned above. Let us call this the benefit
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of exiting for the firm as r, (e.g., recovering the whole or part of the investment and
receiving potential gains from outside opportunities, minus the loss of relocation) and the
cost of losing a valuable asset for the firm to stand for as e. Then, the new payoffs are as
follows. Table 3.2 shows the new payoff matrix for the two players.
Table 3.2 Payoffs of a Private Firm with an Exit Option and a Local Official in a Oneshot Game
A local official
A private firm
with an exit option

Cooperate

Defect

Cooperate

Defect

Scenario 1

Scenario 2

B1, B2

D1-e, A2

Scenario 3

Scenario 4

A1, D2

C1-e+r, C2-e

Scenario 2:
Scenario 2 is the situation where the firm chooses to comply with the rules, but
the local official decides to exploit. For the firm, it will get the net profit D1 deducts the
loss of property e exploited by the local official. For the local official, the bundle benefit
A2 plus the benefits from exploitation and deduct the probability of being caught.
Scenario 4:
Scenario 4 is the situation where both the firm and the local official choose not to
comply with the rules, and the firm also chooses to relocate the investment for recovering
the severe expropriation. For the firm, the net profit C1 deducts the loss of property e
exploited by the local official, plus the extra benefits for evading the rules, deduct the
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probability of being caught, and plus the benefit of exiting r. For the local official, the
bundle benefits C2 plus the benefits from exploitation, but deduct the loss of tax revenue
and the loss of other benefits as a consequence of the firm’s choice, the probability of
being caught and the cost of losing a valuable asset for the firm e.
Solution:
As a result, for the firm, scenario 3 is better than scenario 1 if the extra benefit for
evading the rules is bigger than the probability of being caught, and scenario 4 is better
than scenario 2 if the extra benefit for evading the rules is bigger than the probability of
being caught. The strategic choice made by the firm would be this:
scenario 3> scenario 1> scenario 4> scenario 2
For the local official, scenario 1 is worse than scenario 2 if the benefit from
exploitation for the firm is smaller than the probability of being caught plus the cost of
losing a valuable asset for the firm, and scenario 4 is worse than scenario 3 if the benefit
from exploitation for the firm is smaller than the probability of being caught plus the cost
of losing a valuable asset for the firm. The strategic choice made by the local official
would be this:
scenario 2> scenario 1> scenario 3> scenario 4
That is, if the cost of losing a valuable asset for the firm is sufficiently large, there
exists a pure strategy equilibrium in which the firm chooses to evade while the local
official abides by the rules, as scenario 3 demonstrates.
It is also likely that business transactions for this type of firm may be transparent
to the extent that it is difficult for them to evade the rules. Consequently, the extra benefit
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for evading the rules is 0; so is the probability of being caught. Then, in addition to the
previous equilibrium, there is another pure strategy equilibrium in which both players
abide by the rules, as scenario 1 shows.
At any rate, both scenarios indicate the better property rights protection, which
addresses the commitment problem at the local level. The two games demonstrate that
firms’ characteristics affect the local officials’ behavior with regards to their treatment of
the private firms.
3.4 Data
The quality of data is a major challenge for studies on the political economy of
contemporary China since local officials can easily manipulate the statistics. In this study,
I rely upon two kinds of evidence. The first type of data comes from a nationwide survey
of private firms conducted in 2012 jointly by the All-China Federation of Industry and
Commerce (ACFIC), the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the
United Front Work Department (UFWD), and the Institute of Chinese Private Economy
at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). Appendix A discusses the survey in
detail and the potential weaknesses. The survey collected information on 4,747 firms
from thirty-one provinces. Since there are some missing responses for almost every
question, I kept only 3,397 observations in which data on basic financial indicators, such
as sales revenue and total number of employees, were available.
The second type of data we use is the media reports of government-related
property rights expropriation cases involving local officials and private firms, which were
collected from major news media in China. Appendix B provides more information on
the collection of cases in greater detail and the limitations of our cases.
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3.5 Empirical Test and Research Design
In this section, I test hypotheses generated from the model by analyzing the data
of a nationwide survey of private firms in 2012. I first discuss the research design and
variables, and then I present the main empirical results.
Research Design
Before I precede the analyses of empirical evidence, I first discuss briefly my
main dependent variable—government-related property rights expropriation. Basically,
there are two types of predatory actions that may be taken by local political actors: direct
and indirect taking of property. Direct taking of property can take various forms, ranging
from outright nationalization on a sectoral basis to the seizure of land or a firm by the
government to outright confiscation of the property. 14 In the case of China, indirect
expropriations are a common practice manipulated by local officials, which may involve
arbitrary fees and fines collected by local government, or “charitable contributions” to
government-sponsored projects (Nee and Opper 2012). In my statistical analysis of firmlevel survey, I use arbitrary fees and fines collected by local government as a proxy to
measure the level of local political actors’ predatory actions. As for the media reports of
government-related property rights expropriation cases, the 279 expropriation cases I
documented between 1992 and 2010 are exclusively direct taking of property.
Following existing literature, I use one indicator to measure my dependent
variable—the level of local political actors’ predatory actions (Nee and Opper 2012). 15
First, I use the information on all sorts of arbitrary fees and fines collected by local

14

Zheng (2007) in his study on FDI discusses expropriation and creeping expropriation according to UNCTAD 2003
(p.65).
15 Donations (juanzeng) may be considered as an indicator of government-related property rights expropriations.
However, it is hard to distinguish which donation was voluntarily contributed by the firms or forced to pay.

58

government in addition to taxes in 2011. Then I created a new variable coded as ratiofees, which calculates the proportion of arbitrary fees and fines collected by local
government on firm’s total sales revenue. Arbitrary fees and fines is a perfect indicator of
government-related property rights expropriations because firms must pay these fees and
fines at the local level even though the central government has issued several orders to
stop them.16
The key independent variable is the firm characteristics. What I am looking for is
the availability of exit option a firm has. The survey listed eighteen industry sectors and
asked firm owners what sector your firm’s business is in. The full list of industry sectors
in the survey includes agriculture such as farming, forestry, livestock husbandry, and
fishing, mining, manufacturing, energy such as electricity, gas, and water, construction,
transportation, information services, retail, hotel & restaurant, finance, real estate, rental
& commercial services, science & technology, public infrastructure, resident services,
education, public health, and culture & sports. There is one sector named others, which
means that firms are not clearly specified their business type in the survey thus I am not
able to identify the availability of exit option. Therefore, I omitted this sector in my study.
Also, it is worth noting that firms in manufacturing sector include both those have an exit
option and no exit option.17 Finally, I choose agriculture sector as the baseline category
in the model.

The “three disorders” or sanluan (improper levying of fees, arbitrary fines, and forced apportionment of funds) have
long been major harassments to private firms’ operating business acted by local government. The central government
has issued several orders to stop them since 1990s. The forced apportionment of funds (tanpai) may be considered as
another indicator of government-related property rights expropriations. However, there are two problems in using this
measurement. First, it has large proportions of missing responses, and zero response in the data set. Also, we run a
regression to test and found tanpai is highly correlated with owners’ political background. All of these suggest this
variable may be better indicator of political connections of firm rather than local political actor’s predatory actions.
17 Firms I classified into category of firm without an exit option follow one simple principle that if the firm is mobile. If
the firm’s production factor cannot be move out no matter how much it costs, then the firm was coded as firm without
16
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A host of control variables, mainly including economic conditions and variables
both at firm and entrepreneur levels, are also involved in the model (Dickson 2008). With
respect to economic conditions, I first use firm’s postcode to identify which province a
firm is in. Then I code the top ten GDP per capita provinces as a rich region and the
lowest 10 as a poor region according to the China Statistical Year Book of 2012. Finally,
I created the first dummy variable Region1 identifying whether a firm belongs to a rich
province (rich=1, otherwise=0). The second dummy Region2 was created to capture
whether a firm belongs to a poor province (poor=1, otherwise=0).
Firm-level variables include firm size measured by the total number of employees
in 2011, and the historical ties between the sample firm and the local government of its
locality measured by a binary variable indicating whether the firm was transformed from
an SOE.
At the entrepreneur level, I control for firm owners’ political backgrounds,
measured by Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and minor Democratic Party membership,
a binary variable indicating whether owners used to be public officials, and a dummy
variable indicating whether owners are legislative members including members of
People’s Congress and People’s Political Consultative Conference at both national and
local levels. I also control for entrepreneurs’ education attainment.
Table 3.3 provides a statistical summary for all variables.

an exit option. However, the firm with exit option is not that easy to classify because the costs will be take into account.
For example, a firm in manufacturing or hotel & restaurant sector may have an exit option but with heavy costs.
Therefore, I classified firms with an exit option only conditioned with slightly costs, such as firms in IT services. Those
with heavy costs fell into the third category.
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Table 3.3 Statistical Description of Variables

Firm level
Ratio-fee
Arbitrary fees and fines
Total sales revenue in 2011
Numbers of employees in
2011
Former SOE status
Entrepreneur level
Education
CCP membership
Democratic party
membership
Legislative member
Former government official

Obs.

Mean

Std. Err.

Min.

Max.

3784
4031
4691

0.0302384
66.44514
14271.65

0.2294989
485.6483
134599.8

0 11.76471
0
19041
0 6761939

4952
4988

218.5971
0.058741

1135.873
0.2351628

0
0

53000
1

4980
4886

3.949799
0.3401555

1.116389
0.4738098

1
0

6
1

4886
4835
4861

0.3964388
0.422544
0.3953919

0.4892076
0.4940152
0.488985

0
0
0

1
1
1

Source: Survey on Privately Owned Enterprises in China, 2012 (see Appendix A)
Note: The unit for all financial variables is 10.000 RMB yuan.

Main Empirical Results
I employ a simple linear regression model to estimate the effects of firms’
characteristics on the level of local political actors’ predatory actions on firms’ property
rights. Table 3.4 presents main empirical results. Using the proportion of arbitrary fees
and fines collected by local government on firm’s total sales revenue as the dependent
variable, after controlling for economic conditions and firms’ and entrepreneurs’
backgrounds, I find the value of R-square is quiet low, suggesting arbitrary fees ad fines
are not that arbitrary as the public has perceived. However, two sectors indeed show
some unfair treatment with regards to arbitrary fees and fines. Mining and construction
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industry has a significant and positive effect on the proportion of arbitrary fees and fines
collected by local government on firm’s total sales revenue, suggesting if a firm has no
exit option, then this firm had higher arbitrary fees and fines collected by local
government. Mining industry is clearly a resource-intensive sector and construction
industry is a local market attached sector. These two industries share the same feature of
no exit option. A firm in either these two sectors if choose to relocate its business will
lose everything; therefore it is more likely to be subjected to local political actors’
predatory actions.
Table 3.4 OLS Regression Results
The proportion of arbitrary fees on firm’s total sales revenue
Ratio-fees
Mining
Manufacturing
Energy
Construction
Transportation
Information service
Retail
Hotel & Restaurant
Finance
Real Estate
Rental & Commercial services

2.3**
（0.022）
-0.82
（0.41）
-0.12
（0.906）
2.28**
（0.023）
0.39
（0.689）
0.19
（0.851）
-0.41
（0.681）
0.17
（0.867）
-0.17
（0.865）
0.12
（0.904）
0.44
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Science & Technology
Infrastructure
Resident services
Education
Health
Culture & Sport
Region1
(rich=1, other=0)
Region2
(poor=1, other=0)
Number of employees
Former SOE status
(yes=1, no=0)
CCP membership
(yes=1, no=0)
Democratic Part membership
(yes=1, no=0)
Legislative mebers
(yes=1, no=0)
Former officials
(yes=1, no=0)
Education attainment
Constant

（0.658）
0.03
（0.973）
0.15
（0.878）
-0.2
（0.843）
-0.13
（0.896）
-0.33
（0.741）
0.27
（0.79）
-1.03
（0.305）
0.96
（0.336）
0.01
（0.995）
-0.54
（0.589）
0.07
（0.947）
-0.8
（0.426）
0.87
（0.386）
2.15**
（0.032）
-2.71***
（0.007）
3.4***
（0.001）

N
3300
2
R
0.0097
F-value
1.23
Notes: p-values are in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Among the control variables, firm owner’s political background has a significant
and positive effect on arbitrary fees and fines collected by local government. Firm
owner’s education attainment has a significant and negative effect on the proportion of
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arbitrary fees and fines collected by local government on firm’s total sales revenue. This
means that if a firm owner’s education level is lower, then the firm had higher arbitrary
fees and fines collected by local government. In other words, the level of firm owner’s
education attainment affects local political actors’ predatory actions on its firms’ property
rights.
In general, the regression results confirm the theoretical predictions. The positive
correlation between the availability of firm’s exit option and the level of local political
actors’ predatory actions on this firm suggests firm’s characteristics have a far-reaching
influence on local political actors’ predatory behaviors. Since the firms without exit
option have no place to move out their business, this feature greatly weakens the private
firms’ post-entry bargaining power vis-à-vis local political actors and makes firms
vulnerable to the local officials’ predatory activities, and therefore need to rely on other
mechanisms, such as social networks or bribery, to overcome the commitment problem.
3.6 Analysis of Media Reports of Property Rights Expropriation Cases
This empirical investigation relies on media exposure of government-related
property rights expropriation cases involving local officials and private firms. I
documented a total of 279 cases based on news reports from major newspapers,
magazines and news portals in China. Appendix B discusses the collection of cases in
greater detail and the limitations of the cases.
That being said, the 279 cases we documented between 1992 and 2010 are
adequate to test the two hypotheses: (1) private firms with a high level of FSAs and an
exit option, such as labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms, and high
technology firms, enjoy sufficient property rights protection; and (2) private firms with a
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low level of FSAs and no exit option, such as resource-intensive and local market seeking
firms are vulnerable as the targets of local officials’ predatory activities.
As table 3.5 shows, 243 out of 279 outright expropriation cases are in the energy
industry (including the coal industry, petroleum industry, and electrical power industry),
14 in real estate development, 14 in manufacturing industry, 4 in transportation and
construction, and 4 in the retail and service industry. A total of 92.12% of outright
expropriations are resource-intensive and local market seeking firms, a result confirming
my hypotheses.
Table 3.5 Media Exposure of Government-Related Property Rights Expropriations
Expropriation
Cases (%)

1988-1998

1999-2010

Energy Industry

243 (87.10%)

0

243

Real Estate Development

14 (5.02%)

2

12

Manufacturing

14 (5.02%)

4

10

Transportation and Construction

4 (1.43%)

2

2

Retail and Service

4 (1.43%)

0

4

Total

279 (100.00%)

8

271

Source: Compiled by author.
My cases also reveal that the number of government-related expropriations has
increased sharply in the natural resources sector after 1999. This may have something to
do with the national government’s change of policies toward the coal mining and oil
industries since the 1990s. Before 1999, both the central government and the various
provincial governments encouraged private investment in the coal mining and oil drilling
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industries. Afterwards, the national government decided to take over or shut down small
mines and drilling firms in the name of mining safety or the restructuring of the oil
industry. The process of nationalization on these two natural resource sectors provided
opportunities for local governments to engage in direct expropriation or creeping
expropriation activities. As a result, a large number of property rights disputes has
stemed from the policy changes in coal mining and oil sectors.
Due to the nature of government-related property rights expropriation in the coal
mining and oil industries, I exclude the cases in the energy industry to test the hypotheses.
As shown in table 3.6, 38.89% of expropriation cases are in the manufacturing industry,
and a total of 61.11% of expropriations are resource-intensive and local market seeking
firms, again confirming our hypotheses.
Table 3.6 Media Exposure of Government-Related Property Rights Expropriations
(Without Energy Industry)

Expropriation
Cases (%)

1988-1998

1999-2010

Real Estate Development

14 (38.89%)

2

12

Manufacturing

14 (38.89%)

4

10

Transportation and Construction

4 (11.11%)

2

2

Retail and Service

4 (11.11%)

0

4

Total

36 (100.00%)

8

28

Source: Compiled by author.
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With respect to the manufacturing firms, table 3.7 shows that 7 out of 14 cases
were “red-hat enterprises”18, 4 involved privatizing SOEs or collective-owned enterprises
(COEs)19, and 3 were in the food industry. Among the food-manufacturing cases, one
was related to land acquisition, in which the local government used forced eviction to
seize the factory building for real estate development; and another involved the
crackdown on “organized crime” in Chongqing, in which the private entrepreneur was
sentenced to capital punishment with a penalty of 100 million RMB. Although these food
firms can be characterized as labor-intensive manufacturing firms, they are all local
market seeking with a low degree of FSAs. My cases show that there are no governmentrelated appropriation cases involving labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing
firms, and high technology firms.
Table 3.7 Media Exposure of Government-Related Property Rights Expropriations
(Manufacturing Industry)

Expropriation
Cases (%)
Red-hat

7 (50%)

Restructuring SOEs or COEs

4 (28.57%)

Food Industry

3 (21.43%)

Total

14 (100.00%)

Source: Compiled by author.

The red-hat enterprises are private firms in which those owners disguised their private ownership and registered as
public-owned firms in the early years of market transition in order to evade the “eight employees” restriction. As
discussed in section 4.2, between 1978 and 1988, private businesses were not allowed officially except for “individual
entrepreneurs” (getihu) with less than eight employees. For details of this literature see Chen (2007).
19 The collective-owned enterprises mainly refer to Township and Village Enterprises (TVEs). According to Tian
(2000), a Chinese collective enterprise is characterized by two main features: property rights are vaguely defined and
there is significant involvement of government officials.
18
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Summarizing the cases of government-related property rights expropriation, it is
evident that labor-intensive, export-oriented manufacturing firms, and high technology
firms enjoy sufficient property rights protection, and resource-intensive and local market
seeking firms are vulnerable as targets of local officials’ predatory activities. Therefore,
the empirical evidence lends support to what I would expect from my model.
Interestingly, despite the external policy shock imposed on the mining and energy
industries, my cases still show that the number of government-related expropriations have
increased sharply after 1999, the turning point in the development of private property
rights, when the Constitutional Amendments affirmed the legal status of private
enterprises. The improvement in the legal status of private businesses does not seem to
offer sufficient protection of private property rights. This provides further evidence to
support my thesis that local political officials enjoy great leeway in choosing to abide by
the rules and implement the policies.
Another interesting phenomenon as shown in these cases is that compared to other
manufacturing firms, “red-hat” firms are most vulnerable in terms of property rights
protection. Indeed, it is easy for this type of private entrepreneur to get into a property
rights dispute with local governments. This happens as a consequence of the very nature
of this type of enterprise. They are private firms, but their owners disguised their private
ownership and registered as public-owned firms in the early years of market transition in
order to evade the “eight employees” restriction. After 1988, when businesses with more
than eight employees could be registered as private enterprise, many owners of the “redhat” firms intended to take off the hat. But since the property rights of such firms were
vaguely defined, these owners often found themselves in dispute with local governments.
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The ownership change of manufacturing firms through the privatization of SOEs
and COEs also makes such firms vulnerable. The issue involved in this kind of property
rights dispute is the drain on state owned property. The process of privatization in China
was often accompanied by the drain on state assets because of the agency problem. The
local government may want to secretly privatize SOEs under its control or even
encourage spontaneous privatization (Qian 1996). Under such circumstances, local
officials can easily manipulate the value of the firm and its ownership structure, and
facilitate the illicit asset transfer of such enterprises (Smyth 2000).20 The problems in the
process of privatization of SOEs and COEs also set the stage for disputes over property
rights.
3.7 Conclusion
This study provides a game-theoretic model to study the political economy of
property rights in China, that is, a bargaining game between a firm and a local political
official following the literature of the Obsolescing Bargain Model. The model assumes
that local officials are potential predators and private firms are their prey. The predator
and prey interact strategically in the context in which the central government evaluates
the local officials on the basis of the cadre performance evaluation system.
I identify the mechanisms that may resolve the credible commitment problem. I
show how the incentive structure provided by the Cadre Evaluation System, together with
the firm-specific characteristics, results in a relatively stable condition for the protection
of property rights for private firms. While firms with strong post-entry bargaining power
enjoy a high level of credible commitment from the local government, weak firms are

20

Smyth (2000) examines the problem of the drain on state assets while Ding (2000) discusses the illicit asset stripping
of Chinese state firms.
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vulnerable to the local political officials’ predatory activities, and therefore need to rely
on other mechanism, such as social networks (guanxi) or bribery, to overcome the
commitment problem. In particular, the availability of an exit option greatly enhances the
private firms’ post-entry bargaining power over local political actors in protecting their
property rights.
My model demonstrates that private firms without an exit option may find
themselves in a situation very much like a prisoner’s dilemma in the bargaining
relationship with local officials. Both the firm and the local official will choose the
dominant strategy that is to evade the rules in the one-shot game and end up in the worse
situation, where the firm tries to conceal real profits so that decreases the taxes it pays to
the government, and the local official tries to exploit the firm. The empirical tests both in
quantitative and qualitative study support the hypotheses generated from the model.
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CHAPTER 4
THE CHINESE STYLE OF SECURE PROPERTY RIGHTS
This chapter explores the resources and constraints of local political officials created by
the incentive structure. According to the framework presented in Chapter 2, these
conditions will have an impact on local political officials’ behaviors in the bargaining
relationship with indigenous private investors in terms of property rights protection.
Then, I test the effects of different types of local political leaders on the security of
private property rights quantitatively.
The local political leaders protect private property rights when symbiosis between
local officials and private entrepreneurs is feasible. In this framework, the symbiotic
relationship between local political officials and private entrepreneurs creates conditions
similar to secure property rights at the local level. The degree of symbiotic relationship
between the local officials and indigenous private entrepreneurs determines the level of
private property rights protection. Lower transaction costs make symbiotic relationships
feasible, hence increasing the level of property rights protection. A native political leader
of a locality has lower transaction costs of symbiotic relationship, and therefore
symbiotic relationship between native local officials and local private firms is easier.
Using panel data covering detailed information for all political leaders in 21
prefecture-level cities in Guangdong province between 1992 and 2008, I test the
hypothesis and find a positive impact on the secure private property rights of native local
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political leaders. 166 out of 201 political leaders at prefecture-level municipality are
native. By native, I mean those who were born in Guangdong province. Those who were
born outside Guangdong province are coded as rotated political leaders. Political leaders
include both the Party secretary (the first hand) and the Mayor of the municipal cities.
One common measure used to judge economic development and property rights is
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate or GDP per capita. GDP measurement may
be a good way to measure the overall economic performance but in an authoritarian
regime like China, it is not an accurate indicator to measure the development of private
economy, let alone the security of property rights. I use private investment in fixed assets
as an indicator to measure the security of property rights. This is a good proxy for the
security of property rights because this kind of investment requires significant immediate
costs with only the promise of future revenue. I collect a dataset on private investment in
fixed assets from 1992 to 2008 in 21 prefecture-level cities in Guangdong province.
To see if the main results and inferences are robust, I run two models and conduct
a robust regression. I also conducted the third model, which examines the effects of
nativity on the proportion of private investment in fixed assets on total investment in
fixed assets, and the results are even more robust. All of the findings suggest that having
a native political leader increase private investment substantially.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section sets out a
theoretical framework with a close examination of local political leaders’ characteristics
that guides the empirical analysis. Then I describe research design and the dataset.
Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 4 provides robustness checks.
Section 5 concludes with a summary of the study.
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4.1 The Theoretical Framework
As Chapter 3 has shown, local political leaders’ decision of whether or not prey
on private sector is determined by firm’s resources and constraints. Meanwhile, as
discussed in Chapter 2, local officials are also under strict constraints within the
personnel control systems such as the Cadre Evaluation System (CES), the term limits
system, and the rotation system. If the local official is near 55, or less educated, or no
political connections, he/she will desperately need private sector’s support for his/her
political survival. This symbiotic relationship between less favorable to be promoted
local political officials and private entrepreneurs creates conditions similar to secure
property rights at the local level. The degree of symbiotic relationship between the local
officials and indigenous private entrepreneurs determines the level of private property
rights protection.
Native local officials have lower transaction costs and therefore symbiotic
relationship between native local officials and local private firms is easier. Compare to
rotated local leaders, native local political leaders have more incentives to protect private
property rights in order to get political and economic benefits as well as none material
rewards.
Those local officials who are native face different social constraints from those
rotated leaders. First, for native prefecture-level officials, they had crafted broad and
complex personal webs long before they came to this position from a county or township
level position. Some native local political leaders just don’t want to be promoted to a
higher rank if that position does not have real authority to utilize resources. As a result,
they will promote local economy in order to get economic interests, whether for their
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family businesses or direct money transfers from local firms. They may provide the
public good of localized property rights protection so that they could get closer
connections with local economic elites for their own economic interests.
Second, since the loyalty-based long term relationships and regional affinity are
crucial in establishing political connections, those native local political leaders who do
not have connections but want to be promoted have to establish a new political
connection with provincial leaders. The development of the private sector will serve two
purposes for native local political leaders. On the one hand, the good performance of
local private economy proves their ability to promote local economic growth. On the
other hand, native local political leaders depend on the development of private economy
because what they have for exchange is local economic resources. They will rely on local
private firms to provide economic resources to achieve their goal of being promoted.
Third, from the perspective of local economic actors, market-oriented policy and
2007 law of property rights are clear signal regarding the central authority’s commitment
for the development of private economy. But occasional “left” and “right” ideological
swing and no independent judicial system could not make that commitment credible in
terms of property rights protection. Predatory activities may come from both public and
private actors. Having a native local political leader will be an assurance of property
rights protection because they are weak in comparison to rotated officials. Defective
behaviors and opportunism will cost them much politically, economically and socially. In
the worst scenario, for local private entrepreneurs it is much easier to utilize punishment
to native political leaders rather than rotated ones, as their tenure normally is less than
three years, on average, for local mayors. The ability of retaliation by local private
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entrepreneurs creates stable conditions of property rights protection at the local level and
hence influences private entrepreneurs’ investment decisions.
Finally, local protectionism can be seen as a bad thing in the view of the central
government or provincial government in terms of central coordination, policy
compliances, and destructive local autonomy. It is true that this is the very reason behind
the introduction of term limits and the rotation system by the central government.
However, for indigenous private entrepreneurs, this is one source that helps to overcome
the commitment problem and becomes an assurance of protection for their investment.
In sum, for any local official, he/she cares about his/her own payoff that includes
his/her wages and potential transfers from the local firms, money or favors. But those
local officials who are native are more likely to protect private property rights since their
political and economic interests are intertwined more closely with the private
entrepreneurs. The credible threats of retaliation to potential predatory activities by local
indigenous private entrepreneurs creates stable conditions of property rights protection at
local level and hence encourages private investment and economic development.
As discussed in Chapter 2, I argue that those local political leaders who are native
are more likely to protect private property rights since the interests of local political
actors and economic actors are intertwined closely. Native political leaders have less
chance to be promoted and have more incentives to protect private investment in order to
get political support as well as economic benefits.
Players
Before formalizing the symbiosis logic of secure property rights, I identify the
players and their preferences as follows. There are three players in the local economy,
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Government (G) is the principal, the local political official serves (S) as the supervisor
and the Private entrepreneur (P) is the agent. In the context of China, I identify political
actors as local political leaders, economic actors as indigenous private entrepreneurs, and
government includes central and local.
Preferences
I make an extremely simple assumption that the goal of the government and
political actors may not be the same. Government (G), both central and local, cares about
tax revenue. The primary and foremost concern of local political leaders (S) is to stay in
an office and being promoted to a higher rank. But the ultimate goal of local political
leaders is to acquire more wealth and secure their possessions. In other words, the pursuit
of political power is the means to achieve the end (wealth acquisition). For the
indigenous private entrepreneur (P), what he/she wants is not only to maximize profit but
also to secure their property rights. For the later goal, economic actors are willing to pay
the costs (Cp) as long as they expect some positive level of profits in compensation.
G cares about tax revenue (t).
S cares about his own payoff, which includes his wages (w) and potential transfers
from the Firms (Ts).
P cares about maximizing its own profits (r) while minimizing costs (c).
The second assumption I make is that indigenous private entrepreneurs do not
necessarily demand efficient property rights. In fact, it is not clear that an individual
private entrepreneur should always demand that the government protect everyone’s
property rights. According to Haber et al. (2003), an indigenous private entrepreneur can
receive utility from the secure and efficient property rights, because this makes her asset
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more liquid, and therefore more valuable. However, if selective enforcement grants the
indigenous private entrepreneur more comparative advantage in the market, then it may
be more profitable to demand less than universal enforcement. Between these two
possibilities, it is assumed that indigenous private entrepreneurs care first and foremost
about their own property rights. Any profit-maximizing actor would readily accept the
exclusive protection of her property rights, providing that it produced better benefits to
that actor.
Finally, it is assumed that there exist information asymmetries between the
government, local political leaders, and economic actors. In other words, the activities of
local political leaders and economic actors cannot be observed by the government, and
indigenous private entrepreneurs cannot perfectly monitor the impact of the government’s
actions or policies upon their property rights.
The Costs of Secure Property Rights (Cp)
Producer (P) chooses whether or not to invest with anticipated tax rate t ≥ 0, and
expected revenue r > c >0，where r is the revenue, c the cost, and t the tax rate. To make
an investment, P needs to get connected with S to protect its property. The costs of
property rights are tolerated as long as P expects some positive level of profits in
compensation (ep). This expected compensation can be a tax discount or special market
access. To sum up,
1. Producer (P) choose whether or not to invest with anticipated tax rate t ≥ 0; r
>c>0
2. Government (G) sets tax rate t, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
3. Game ends with payoffs:
G: t • r
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S: w + Ts

(1 – t) r – c – Cp + ep if investment made
P:
0 if investment not made
For any potential investment, P can choose to get connected with S to get
protection for her investment or not to do so. The profit for not getting connected is r-trc> 0 with the risk of being predated k. The profit for getting connected is r-tr-c-Cp+ep>0
with property protection. Parameters r and tr are known to S and P but cannot be
observed by G. To lower the risk of predation, P needs to get connected with S to get
property protection. I assume that P cannot get connected with G for property protection.
(In the real world, it is impossible to get connected with the central government and local
government because under authoritarian rule it is almost impossible to access the
government through formal institutions. In other words, it is much easier to access the
government through political actors). This assumption can be relaxed by assuming that it
is very costly to reach G for protection.
To secure property rights, P and S can cooperate by signing a contract.* In
cooperation, P pays S. However, they face some transaction costs to agree with this
arrangement. I assume that S can get part of Ts = iCp where 0≤i≤1and (1-i) Cp, which
indicates the transaction costs of symbiotic relationship.
In this context, the wage of S is a constant w. When S failed in political struggles,
she/he loses her/his wage w. The probability of being punished is mnp, where m denotes
the failure probability in political struggle and n denotes the detection probability.
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Investment Decision
For any potential investment, P can choose whether or not to invest with an
anticipated tax rate t ≥ 0. She can also choose to get connected with S to get protection
for her investment.
If she chooses not to get connected, her problem is as follows:
r-tr-c> 0 with the risk of being predated k.

(1)

If she chooses to get connected, her problems become as follows:
r-tr-c-Cp+ep > 0

(2)

subject to the participation constraint of S:
Ts =iCp≥ mnpw

(3)

Thus,
ep-Cp≥ mnpw
i

(4)

In the current framework, a symbiotic relationship is more likely for higher i and
thus the private investment growth rates are higher for higher i. This can be seen from
equation (4), as the right-hand side is decreasing in i. This simple framework generates
the main hypothesis regarding the symbiotic property protection and I will test with data
as follows.
Hypothesis: Symbiotic relationship between political and economic actors at the
local level is more likely to happen when local political officials are native and
hence the private investment growth rates are higher.
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4.2 Research Design
To assess the determinants of property rights protection, the general model tested
is Private investment
= f Nativity
+ 92Private
+ 92Total
+ Region
+ Education
+ Edu1
+ Firstjob
+ Partyschool
+ Age
+ Error term
Dependent Variable
Private investment is my dependent variable and an indicator of property rights
protection. I use private investment in fixed assets as an indicator to measure the security
of property rights. This is a good proxy for secure property rights because this kind of
private investment requires significant immediate costs with only promises of future
revenue. I also created a new variable coded as ratio-private, which calculates the
proportion of private investment in fixed assets on total investment in fixed assets to
gauge the level of private property rights protection in a locality.
One common measure used to judge economic development and property rights is
GDP growth rate and GDP per capita (Liu et al. 2012). GDP measurement may be a good
way to measure the overall economic performance but is not a good indicator to measure
the security of property rights. Scholars argue that China’s economic development largely
relies on large-scale investment to facilitate high GDP growth rate. Investment can be
categorized into two types, that concerning infrastructure and real estate properties, and
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that in corporate development. The high GDP growth rate does not necessarily indicate
the growth rate of private investment because this investment-led growth shows the large
part of investment are government fund infrastructure projects and real estate properties
rather than private investment. It may well be the case that the cities with higher
economic growth rates had received more economic resources from higher authorities or
borrowed money from state-owned banks to finance infrastructure projects.
Despite the contribution of previous studies, the common problem in these
empirical studies is the GDP measurement as an indicator of property rights protection.
GDP growth rate or GDP per capita does not necessarily mean the development of
private economy or the security of property rights for several reasons. First, before 1978,
private economy was strictly forbidden. Anyone who did private business would be
severely punished including being arrested and persecuted. The major contribution of
GDP was from the state sector. Between 1978 and 1988, the private sector was not
allowed officially except “individual entrepreneurs” (getihu) doing small business with
less than eight employees. This is why other literature places more emphasis on the
informal and coping strategies of the private entrepreneurs or local officials to get around
the restrictions imposed by the unfavorable formal institutions, such as disguising their
operations as collective enterprises or foreign firms in order to protect themselves (Tsai
2007; Oi and Walder 1999; Sull 2005). The 1988 regulations allowed businesses with
more than eight employees to be registered as “private enterprise” (siying qiye), but it
was only after the introduction of the Company Law in 1993 that paved the way to the
rapid development in private sector during the 1990’s. Therefore, any empirical study on
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the development of private economy and property rights in China using GDP
measurement does not distinguish these three time periods will distort the picture.
Second, China is a mixed-market economy in which the state sector still plays an
important role. For example, in 2010, the private investment in fixed assets made 13.7%
of Guangdong province’s total investment in fixed assets. After including the investment
of self-employed individuals, other limited liability and share holding firms, all four
kinds of investment made 45.83% of total investment in fixed assets.21
Finally, under the cadre rotation system and political officials’ relatively short
tenure in one position before promotion or rotation (less than three years, on average, for
local mayors), local officials are under enormous pressure to show their ability to produce
economic growth quickly. One way of generating quick economic growth is to borrow
money from banks to finance massive infrastructure projects. The typical way is by
selling land or using land as collateral to borrow large sums of money from state-owned
banks. The abusive land requisitions and forced evictions caused by local “land finance”
have produced great grievances among rural peasants, urban dwellers, and small business
owners. The worst example is the Chongqing model, where GDP growth rate is high and
property rights violence prevalent. During Bo Xilai’s tenure, his administration borrowed
the equivalent of more than 50% of local GDP to finance the construction projects. At the
same period, many private entrepreneurs were imprisoned and billions in private
properties were confiscated in the name of the campaign “signing red songs and
crackdown black gangs” (Changhongdahei) (Pei 2012).

21

Guangdong Bureau of Statistics. Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2011. Beijing: Statistical Press of China.
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Because GDP measurement is not an accurate indicator to measure the
development of private economy and the security of property rights, I use private
investment in fixed assets as an indicator to measure the security of property rights. This
is a good proxy for the security of property rights because this kind of investment
requires significant risk with only promises of future revenue in an authoritarian regime. I
collect a dataset on private investment in fixed assets from 1992 to 2008 in 21 prefecturelevel cities in Guangdong province.
Explanatory Variable
I explore the degree of symbiotic relationship between political and economic
actors by examining the biographical information of the prefecture level political leaders
in 21 municipality cities in Guangdong province. These local political leaders include
111 mayors and 92 party secretaries. I trace the careers of all the 203 political leaders of
21 municipalities between 1992 and 2008. I proxy the transaction costs of symbiotic
relationship by whether the top leaders of prefecture-level cities are native and create one
dummy variable nativity. Nativity identifies whether a mayor or party secretary was born
in Guangdong province, which takes a value of 1, otherwise its value is 0. Once a
municipality had local political leaders who were born in Guangdong province, the
chances were high that the leaders would have close ties to local economic actors and
face more strict social constraints; therefore, they were more likely to protect property
rights. In contrast, rotated local political leaders would have close ties to the higher
authorities so that they would lack the incentives to protect the private property rights.
Thus, the dummy variable I constructed would have a positive effect on the dependent
variables.
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Control Variables
A host of control variables are also involved in my model. I include initial
economic variables, geographical variables, and some socioeconomic variables.
According to the literature, initial economic conditions will have positive effects on
economic development (Solow 1956). In the model with the private investment in fixed
assets from 1992 to 2008 as the dependent variable, I control private investment in fixed
assets in 1992 and total investment in fixed assets in 1992.
With respect to geographical variables, I create a dummy variable region (PRD=1,
other=0) identifying whether a municipality belongs to Pearl River Delta (PRD) region,
Eastern coast, Western coast, or Mountain area. This dummy variable is to control the
location advantage of a municipality and the effects PRD on the economic growth of a
municipality.
I create five dummy variables in order to control socioeconomic factors that may
have impacts on the dependent variable. One is education (education in Guangdong=1,
otherwise=0). This variable is created to catch the phenomenon of those local leaders
who were not born in Guangdong province but pursued their higher education in
Guangdong. According to the literature of social connections, locality of origin,
classmates, and job-related colleagues are common ways to establish social networks in
China (Guo 2001; Luo 2007). Therefore, those rotated political leaders who studies in
Guangdong would have established close ties to local elites. I also created a dummy
variable edu1 (college degree=1, otherwise=0) to control local political leaders’
education attainment as an indicator for individual human capital.
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Likewise, the dummy variable (first job in Guangdong=1, otherwise=0) is to
control job-related social networks. And party school experience (Yes=1, No=0) is to
detect the common practice where local political leaders strive to establish new political
connections with higher officials during their study in party schools since the party
school is the best place to meet other political leaders. Finally, I created a dummy
variable age to control local political leaders age effect on their behaviors.
4.3 Data
I collected a dataset on private investment growth rate, the prefecture-level of
political leaders for 21 municipality cities in Guangdong province between 1992 and
2008. I focus on Guangdong province because Guangdong province is one of the most
prosperous in China with the highest GDP among all the provinces, but the disparity
within the province is larger than between provinces.
There are 21 municipality cities in Guangdong province, 9 in PRD region, 4 in
eastern coast, 3 in western coast, and 5 in mountain areas. A prefecture-level municipality
is subject to the jurisdiction of a provincial government, and directly controls some urban
districts while overseeing some counties or smaller cities on behalf of the provincial
government.
The data used in this paper comes from two primary sources: First, the data of
private investment in fixed assets between 1992 and 2008 come from Guangdong
Statistical Yearbook. It is worth noting that the data of the Yunfu municipality only
covers from 1996 to 2008 because Yunfu was a newly created prefecture-level city in
1996.
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Second, the data and CVs on 203 municipality’s leaders between 1992 and 2008
come from government website of Guangdong province, People’s Daily online, and
municipality newspapers. Information on two mayors and one party secretary are missing
in this dataset. Table 4.1 presents a descriptive statistics of variables.
As shown in Table 4.1, the average length in office of prefectural level officials is
round 3 years. The average age is 51.5 years old, where the youngest local leader is at 38;
and the oldest at 66. The average of private investment in fixed assets is around 14.63
(1.463 billon RMB Yuan); the average of total investment in fixed assets is around
206.55 (20.655 billon RMB Yuan). The average ratio private investment on total
investment is 0.147, which means the average percentage of private investment on total
investment is 14.7%.
Table 4.1 Statistical Description of Variables

Variables

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Tenure
197 3.395939 1.891329
1
11
Age
599 51.50918 4.919027
38
66
Private investment
664 14.62557 11.11922
0.19
71.86
Total investment
665 206.5487 312.5168
7.19
2101.45
Nativity
657 0.8219178 0.3828734
0
1
Region
666 0.4324324 0.4957859
0
1
Education
413 0.748184 0.4345825
0
1
Education
attainment
590
0.5 0.5004243
0
1
First job
532 0.862782 0.3444012
0
1
Party school
519 0.5722543 0.4952291
0
1
Ratio-private
663 0.1474508 0.1012198 0.0001476 0.4584749
Source: Compiled by author.
Note: The unit for all financial variables is 100.000.000 RMB yuan.
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As a comparison, Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 present descriptive statistics on native
local officials and rotated officials. The average length in office is very close for native
mayors or the Party secretaries and rotated ones, around 3 years. The average age is also
very close for native local political leaders and rotated ones, around 51 years old.
The average of private investment in fixed assets between 1992 and 2008 is 15.13
(1.513 billion RMB Yuan) for places where have native officials, but 12.70 (1.27 billion
RMB Yuan) for rotated officials. The municipality cities with native political leaders
have higher private investment than the cities with rotated leader about 20%. In contrast,
the average of total investment in the cities with rotated leaders is 454.41 (45.441 billion
RMB Yuan), but it is only 154.61 (15.461 billion RMB Yuan) with native leader, which
is higher almost 3 times.
Table 4.2 Statistical Description of Variables on Native Prefecture-level Political Leaders
Obs
Tenure
Age
Private investment
Total investment
Nativity
Region
Education
Education
attainment
First job
Party school
Ratio-private

Std. Dev.

Min

153
3.529412 1.970369
482 51.66805 4.974966
540 15.13476 11.31886
539 154.6141 211.6711
540
1
0
540 0.3685185 0.4828503
306 0.8823529 0.3227175

1
38
0.32
7.19
1
0
0

476
421
405
539

Mean

0.4390756
0.9714964
0.6049383
0.1615698

0.4967965
0.1666044
0.4894686
0.1004819

11
66
71.86
1687.11
1
1
1

0
1
0
1
0
1
0.004481 0.4584749

Source: Compiled by author.
Note: The unit for all financial variables is 100.000.000 RMB yuan.
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Max

Table 4.3 Statistical Description of Variables on Rotated Prefecture-level Political
Leaders
Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Tenure
39 3.076923 1.528408
1
6
Age
117
50.8547 4.644732
40
60
Private investment
115
12.6973 10.01239
0.19
68.39
Total investment
117
454.41 524.4573
16.21
2101.45
Nativity
117
0
0
0
0
Region
117 0.7008547 0.459853
0
1
Education
107 0.364486 0.4835506
0
1
Education
attainment
114 0.754386 0.4323511
0
1
First job
111 0.4504505 0.4997952
0
1
Party school
114 0.4561404 0.5002716
0
1
Ratio-private
115 0.0841656 0.0808905 0.0001476 0.4017234
Source: Compiled by author.
Note: The unit for all financial variables is 100.000.000 RMB yuan.

It is worth noting that the average proportion of private investment in fixed assets
on total investment in cities with native political leaders is 16.16%, but in cities with
rotated political leaders is only 8.4%. All these figures suggest that the prefectural cities
with rotated political leaders have lower private investment but much higher total
investment.
4.4 Main Empirical Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 4.4. I first estimate the correlation
coefficients between the dependent variable and the independent variable. In model 1,
the dependent variable nativity has a positive (2.14) and significant (P<0.033) effect on
private investment, which is consistent with the theoretical expectation.
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Table 4.4 OLS Regression Results
Dependent variable: Private investment
Model 1
Model 2
Nativity
(native=1, other=0)
92private

2.14*
(0.033)

92total
Region
Education
(Guangdong=1, other=0)
Education attainment
(college=1, other=0)
Firstjob
(Guangdong=1, other=0)
Partyschool
(yes=1, no=0)
Age
Constant

12.26
0.000
655
0.007
4.57

N
R2
F-value
P-values are in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

3.33***
(0.001)
6.72***
(0.000)
-3.38***
(0.001)
0.17
(0.862)
-1.04
(0.301)
3.94***
(0.000)
-0.85
(0.398)
2.92**
(0.004)
0.88
(0.381)
-0.16
(0.874)
353
0.2184
10.65

Ratio-private
Model 3
3.97***
(0.000)
3.8***
(0.000)
-4.91***
(0.000)
-7.3***
(0.000)
1.36
(0.174)
0.67
(0.503)
-4.69***
(0.000)
1.58
(0.114)
-2.04*
(0.042)
5.25***
(0.000)
352
0.4794
35

In model 2, after controlling for the initial economic variables, geographical
features, and socioeconomic factors, we can see that the correlation coefficient between
private investment and nativity is positive (3.33) and highly significant (P<0.001),
indicating that having a native political leader has positive effect on private investment in
fixed assets. In other words, if a city has a native political leader, then this city has higher
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private investment, suggesting private firms in this city enjoys better property rights
protection.
Among the control variables, the initial economic conditions have a significant
effect on private investment. But what is interesting is that private investment in 1992 has
a positive effect whereas total investment in 1992 has a negative effect on private
investment. As for socioeconomic variables, the coefficient of education is insignificant;
suggesting whether a local political leader studied in Guangdong did not affect private
investment. However, the level of education attainment has a positive effect on private
investment. Also, party school experience has a positive and significant effect on private
investment. Those local political leaders who have higher education and those who have
party school experience promote local private economy. The geographical variable has no
significant effect, which indicates that whether a city is in PRD, east coast, west coast, or
mountain areas is not important to private investment in Guangdong province.
Overall, the regression results are very consistent to my theoretical prediction.
Native local political leaders are more likely to protect private property rights and hence
encourage local private economy. Since the native political leaders in the province had
more close ties with local economic elites, they would have more incentives to promote
the development of private economy.
4.5 Robust Test
I ran the third model, where the independent variable is ration-private, the
proportion of private investment in fixed assets on total investment in fixed assets. The
results are even more robust. The correlation coefficient between private investment and
nativity is positive (3.97) and highly significant (P<0.000), indicating that having a native
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political leader has strong positive effect on private investment. However, there are
different results between the model 2 and the model 3 among the control variables. First,
the level of education has a positive effect on private investment, but has no effect on the
ratio private investment. Second, those leaders who had their first job in Guangdong have
no effect on private investment, but have a negative effect on the ratio private investment.
Third, party school experience has a positive and significant effect on private investment,
but has no effect on ration private investment. Finally, local political leaders’ age has no
effect on private investment, but has a slightly negative effect on ratio private investment.
To see if the above results and inferences are robust, I ran two models. Comparing
model 1 and model 2, we find that they are similar in terms of the effects of the
independent variables and explanation power indicating that the relationship between
property rights protection and nativity of local political leaders are stable and my
specification are robust. I also conducted the third model, which examines the effects of
nativity on the ratio private investment and the results are even more robust. All of the
findings confirm the theoretical prediction that having native local political leaders
increase private investment substantially.
4.6 Conclusion
My study tries to explore the micro-foundations of the credible commitment logic
by formalizing symbiotic logic in property rights protection and provides some empirical
evidence for it. I have shown that when there were no credible commitment to protect
property rights, native local political leaders had incentives of supporting local private
entrepreneurship for political, economic, and reputation building. Indigenous local
private entrepreneurs were more likely to invest in the localities with native local political
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leaders because in a small community with dense social connections they could monitor
the potential predatory activities and provide credible threats of retaliation. The
transaction costs in the symbiotic relationship between native local political leaders and
indigenous private entrepreneurs are low, and therefore this relationship is more likely to
happen. The interactions between political and economic actors created conditions
similar to secure property rights, and hence encouraged the development of private
economy. Though property rights protection afforded by this logic is unstable and
localized, in places where secure and efficient property rights are missing, this
mechanism has been effective in fostering local economic development.
Two main challenges for this study are measurement and data quality. For the
challenge of measurement, I used private investment as an indicator to measure the
security of property rights. This is a better proxy than GDP measurement since this kind
of investment bears considerable risks with only promises of future revenue whereas
GDP growth may not require the commitment to protect private property rights, as long
as the local leaders could gain economic resources for higher authorities or state-owned
financial institutions.
Data quality is a common concern to any study on contemporary China. I test the
hypothesis of the model using various sources of data: biographies of local political
leaders, statistical yearbooks, and the media reports. Empirical results I tested in this
paper are consistent with the theoretical prediction. All the findings suggest having native
local political leaders promoted a substantially higher level of private investment. While
my study focuses on Guangdong province, the symbiotic logic can apply to other
provinces as well.
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CHAPTER 5
LOCAL INDUSTRY POLICYMAKING AS A SOURCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
A Case Study of B&B Industry Policymaking in Xiamen

This chapter provides a case study of local B&B industry policymaking that further
support the second hypothesis generated from the model—the bargaining game between
private investors and local officials, presented in Chapter 2. It shows how different types
of local officials make very different local industry policy choices under the same
incentive structure, and, therefore, create a condition that allows for property rights
protection or expropriation.22
A large body of literature has attributed China’s economic miracle to the direct
consequences of fiscal and political institutions rather than economic institutions such as
the property rights regime. Growth-driven activities pursued by local governments or
local officials were directly shaped by incentive structures, such as fiscal arrangement
and cadre performance evaluation system, designed by the central government. But the
incentive structure itself cannot explain different behaviors of local governments, ranging
from developmental, corporatists, entrepreneurial, and predatory, which led to variations
in local economic performance.
22

The basic facts in this paper were collected from news reports, government reports, as well as interviews. It is
noteworthy that interviews only serve as supplementary sources of information. The validity and reliability of
constructed interviews may be questionable with its intervening nature, particular when informants consciously and
unconsciously make sense of their research. The examination of media repots and government reports will help to
restore an original scene that seeks to make intelligible reasons state agents give for their actions. My interviewees
included officials, B&B business owners, chairmen of B&B associations, journalists, and scholars in Xiamen. To the
purpose of methodological reliability in the interviews, I tried to ask the same questions of different people to find
common answers.
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Local industry policymaking has been treated as the local states’ or local officials’
rational response to a problem, a simple strategic action to faction power struggles, or
muddling through bureaucratic politics decision-making. The role local officials play in
the local industry policy initiatives and policymaking and its effects on property rights is
not clear. Local officials may pursue very diverse industry policy choices in accordance
with the conditions and constraints placed on them. As Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 have
shown, personal characteristics of local officials under the same institutional setting as
the Cadre Evaluation System (CES) create advantages and constraints, which influence
local officials’ behaviors toward private property rights in order to achieve their career
concerns and monetary interests.
My theory argues that native local officials are more likely to respond to their local
“support” constituency’s interests in local policy making than transferred/rotated
officials,23 especially those who transferred from the central agencies. Whether or not
local state becomes predatory or developmental depends on what types of key local
officials and whether they are native or have been rotated/transferred from outside that
locality. Compared with native local officials, the rotated/transferred local officials tend
to be predatory to private property rights regardless of their orientations toward economic
growth as a result of the cadre performance evaluation system.
In addition to the empirical test in Chapter 4, this chapter further provides the
support by examining the role of different types of local officials in local industry
policymaking or initiative and policy changes. Taking policy changes of B&B industry in
Xiamen as an example, this chapter shows that under the current institutional
arrangements, local leaders possess a great deal of autonomy over local industry policy
23

The idea of “support” constituency comes from the “dual constituency” hypothesis (Fiorina 1974).
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making thus allowing them to pursue their own preferences, and political and economic
interests strategically in dealing with private sector. As a result, individual local officials
rather than the governments (central or local) become a major source of uncertainty for
private property rights in China even though the central government enacted the Property
Rights Law in 2005.
This chapter attempts to answer the following questions: Why and how the local
industry policy on B&B business has been made? Why is there a dramatic change in local
industry policy toward B&B business in Gulangyu? Why the change of local industry
policy is possible? How was this policy change implemented?
The case study constitutes four sections. The first section introduces the
development of the B&B sector in Xiamen. The second section demonstrates policy
change of B&B industry and shows that the problem of “doing business without license”
and “fine and detention of B&B owners” are direct consequences of local industry policy
changes. The third section presents how and why two contradictory local industry
policies took place, the logics behind such changes, and their outcomes. The fourth
concludes.
5.1 The Development of the Bed & Breakfast Industry in Gulangyu, Xiamen
The bed-and-breakfast (B&B) business has been increasing dramatically throughout
the world. In China, the B&B industry emerged as a new phenomenon in the late 1990s
with the development of domestic tourism. Like elsewhere, the nature of B&B business
has resulted in a great variety of establishments, as well as what constitutes a B&B (Jones
& Guan 2011). In the most cases, a B&B often refers to a homestay, or a “family hotel”
(an English translation of the Chinese name 家庭旅馆) as it is often an owner-occupied
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private home with a number of guest rooms. But increasingly, more and more Chinese
B&B hostels are under the operation of private entrepreneurs who are not owners but
entered the business through investing private capital. In either case, the B&B presents a
great opportunity for the growth of entrepreneurship in China. In this study, I use the
term B&B hostel that includes both owner-occupied “family hotels” and non-owner
invested inns or lodges.
B&B hostels in China are usually located around famous scenic spots or attractive
tourism destinations, and achieved great success (Zheng & Li 2007; Lu 2007). In general,
local government encouraged residents to operate B&B businesses to relieve the stress on
tourist accommodation and to facilitate local economic development. But as the case of
the Gulangyu B&B industry shows, local political leaders’ attitudes toward B&B industry
are very different and hence affect their policy choices on the industry’s development and
private investment.
The hotel business has been categorized as a special sector in China. Theoretically
speaking, anyone who wants to enter the hotel business should apply for a special permit
after the facility meets several requirements set by different government agencies. The
process of so-called “six licenses” of a B&B hostel takes at least six months to complete.
As a result, most B&B owners started their investment for the business when they got the
first permission from the local sub-district government. Table 5.1 shows the application
process of a B&B hostel in Gulangyu, Xiamen.
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Table 5.1 The Process of Six-License Application for a B&B Hostel in Xiamen

A

B

1

2

3

4

5

6

Pre-permission from Gulangyu sub-district government
Permission from GSMC (beginning in May 2010)
License 1—Fire Certificate from Siming district Fire department
License 2—Special Sector Permission from Siming district police station
License 3—Industry and Commerce Business License from Siming district Administration of
Industry and Commerce
4. License 4—Tax Certificate
5. License 5—Sanitary Certificate
6. License 6—Environmental Protection Certificate
A.
B.
1.
2.
3.

Source: Cai Changchun, “Gualngyu Shengyi zhongde Minzi ‘Ermeng’” [Private
Investment’s ‘Nightmare’ in Gulangyu’s World Heritage Application Process],
Fazhizhoume [Rule by Law Weekend], 09-04-2013.
Gulangyu is an island off the southwest coast of Xiamen city, which is an old port
city in Fujian province in southern China and has been one of five Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) since 1980. As a place of residence for Westerners during the China’s
colonial past, it is famous for its colonial architecture and for hosting more than 600
pianos, giving it the nickname of “Piano Island.” The island is on China’s top list of
National Scenic Spots and is one of the most popular domestic tourist destinations.
Administratively, it forms Gulangyu sub-district of Xiamen’s Siming district
government. However, the island is also under the administrative guidance of GulangyuWanshi Scenic Management Committee (GSMC) that is directly controlled by Xiamen
government. Table 5.2 shows this unique nature of administrative system.
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Table 5.2 The “Duel Administrative System” of Gulangyu

Xiamen government

Siming district
Government

Gulangyu-Wanshi
Scenic Management
Committee (GSMC)

license 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
permission B beginning in
May 2010

Gulangyu sub-district
(pre-permission)

B&B
Hostels

Source of Table 5.2: “The brief introduction of Gulangyu-Wanshi Scenic Management
Committee,” at
http://www.gly.cn/zhfxxgk/zhfxxgkml/index.htm?u=/zhfxxgk/zhfxxgkml/gwhgk/index.ht
m
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GSMC enjoys equal power but shares different administrative responsibilities with
Siming district government in the hierarchical government structure. This arrangement
can be traced back to 2003 when Gulangyu was originally a district of Xiamen but
dissolved and transferred its partial administrative power to Siming district. Under this
dual administrative system, the GSMC is responsible for Gulangyu’s scenic regulation,
preservation, construction and management while Gulangyu sub-district government is
responsible for the residents of the island.24
The so-called “duel administrative system” has been cited as a factor that affects the
development of Guangyu B&B industry (Huang 2013). However, as this essay will show
it is local political leaders’ personal policy choices, which determined the change of B&B
industry policy, and hence affected the private property rights.
Xiamen’s first private owned hostel emerged in the late 1980’s in Gulangyu. In 2006,
the first B&B hostel started business when the former German counselor’s building was
renovated and transformed into a B&B hostel. But it was only after the pass of the
“Regulations on Gulangyu B&B Industry (Trial)” in 2008 that the industry began to
develop rapidly. There were only six B&B hostels in 2008. As of 2013, privately owned
B&B hostels have increased to almost four hundred. Figure 5.1 shows the number of
B&B in Gulangyu between 2006 and 2013.
However, of the 400 B&B hostels only 126 are fully licensed. Another 130 B&B
hostels are at various stages of the six-licenses application process. The remaining 100 or
so hostels are operating without any license. Although 130 hostels only have partial
license they still pay all relevant taxes and fees, and received the “proof of temporary tax

“The brief introduction of Gulangyu-Wanshi Scenic Management Committee”
http://www.gly.cn/zhfxxgk/zhfxxgkml/index.htm?u=/zhfxxgk/zhfxxgkml/gwhgk/index.htm
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payment” from relevant local governmental agencies. Figure 5.2 demonstrates the
distribution of licensed B&B hostels in Gulangyu by 2013.
Figure 5.1 The Number of Bed & Breakfast Hostels in Gulangyu from 2006 to 2013
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Source: Cai Changchun, “Gualngyu Shengyi zhongde Minzi ‘Ermeng’” [Private
Investment’s ‘Nightmare’ in Gulangyu’s World Heritage Application Process],
Fazhizhoume [Rule by Law Weekend], 09-04-2013, and Xu Yixin, “Gulangyu B&Bs
(in Chinese).” The Summit Forum for the Development of B&Bs Across the Strait,
September, 2014.
5.2 The Change of Local Policy on Gulangyu B&B Industry
With the rapid development of B&B industry in Gulangyu, the local government
faced great challenges in managing the fast growing number of tourists and B&B hostels,
particularly in regulating the market, and providing public goods. In response to these
challenges, local government added extra procedures as a way of managing the B&B
industry in Gulangyu in May 2010. In other words, any one who wants to start a B&B
business should get approval from GSMC in addition to the six licenses in May 2010.
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Figure 5.2 The Distribution of Licensed B&B Hostels in Gulangyu by 2013
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Source: Cai Changchun, “Gualngyu Shengyi zhongde Minzi ‘Ermeng’” [Private
Investment’s ‘Nightmare’ in Gulangyu’s World Heritage Application Process],
Fazhizhoume [Rule by Law Weekend], 09-04-2013, and Xu Yixin, “Gulangyu B&Bs
(in Chinese).” The Summit Forum for the Development of B&Bs Across the Strait,
September, 2014.
The problem of “doing business without a license” in the B&B sector in Gulangyu is
a direct consequence of local government’s decision to stop processing all B&B
applications, no matter at what stage a B&B hostel was in the process of the six-license
application, as well as their decision to stop accepting new applications in late 2011. In
the first half of 2012, the application process was restarted but it was closed again in July
2012. Because of the long process of the six-licenses application, no single B&B hostel
was able to complete its application during this period resulting in 130 B&B hostels at
various stages of the application process. Since then, another 100 B&B hostels were
established without any license due to this local administrative decision.
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In May of 2013, the GSMC issued “Gulangyu Applying for World Cultural Heritage
Improvement Projects—A Specific Plan for Gulangyu B&B Industry” (the Plan), which
aims to regulate the confusions about the development of the B&B industry in Gulangyu.
The plan was drafted by the joint work of GSMC and Siming district government, and
ratified by the Planning Department of Xiamen. As the date of the promulgation, all
applications and clearance of B&B hostels in Gulangyu should follow the guidance of the
Plan. According to the Plan, almost half of all B&B hostels in Gulangyu will be closed
down, which means nearly 10 to 20 million private investment will be under threat. The
Plan also provides practical guidance to the procedure of shutting down a B&B business.
In order to meet the cut-off numbers, the Plan urges regulatory and law enforcement
agencies to work hard in checking and closing down those B&B hostels who are “doing
business without a license”. Beginning in late 2013, many owners of B&B hostels with
partial licenses were fined and detained by local police station for 5 to 15 days.25
The above description of the development of the B&B industry in Gulangyu shows
very clearly that the problem of “doing business without a license” in the B&B sector in
Gulangyu and “fine and detention of B&B owners” in Xiamen are direct consequences of
the administrative decision in 2011 and local government agencies’ orders in 2013. But
there is no doubt that the development of the Gulangyu B&B industry was a result of
local government’s industry policy introduced in 2008.
In the next section, I will show how the local industry policy of B&B sector becomes
a source of private property rights protection. A dramatic change in local industry policy
toward B&B business in Gulangyu turned out to be a way of private property rights

Han Yuting “Gulangyu Applies for World Cultural Heritage: Encouraging Private Investment Turned Out Fine and
Detention” Jinjing Guancha Bao [Economic Review Daily] (Beijing) 09-27-2014.
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expropriation. The comparison of two local political leaders’ characteristics and career
pattern demonstrates how the change of local industry policy is possible and how this
policy change was implemented, as well as why that dramatic policy change toward the
Gulangyu B&B industry has been made.
5.3 Local Industry Policymaking as a Source of Property Rights Protection or
Expropriation

The origin of the B&B sector development in Gulanyu can be traced back to then the
“first hand” (number one position) political leader of Xiamen, the Party secretary He
Lifeng. Theoretically speaking, government leaders such as governors or mayors are
responsible to economic affairs. In practice, the Party secretary has the final say over
everything, including policies and personnel placement. This is because the Party and
state hierarchies are intertwined in China. In the Chinese political structure, wherever
there is a governor or mayor, there is a corresponding Party secretary, except at lower
levels where the Party secretary and the executive are sometimes the same person. The
Party secretary is usually the number one boss in the jurisdiction due to the working
structure of the Party Committee. For example, at the city level, the Party secretary leads
the city Party Committee, which consists of the mayor and vice mayors, as well as other
officials heading important departments in the Party. The Party Committee members have
a clear division of labor, where every member is responsible for certain affairs in the city.
But the Party Committee determines all the major issues in the city, and inside the
committee the Party secretary has the final say over everything, including policies and
personnel placement.
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The Policymaking of the Gulangyu B&B Industry in Xiamen
As I will show in this section, the Party secretary of Xiamen, He Lifeng played a
decisive role in policy initiative and policy making of the B&B industry in Gulangyu and
deserves special notice. Born in 1955 in Xingning, Guangdong province, He went to
neighboring Fujian province as a zhiqing (sent down urban youth) when he was eighteen.
In 1978, He became a college student studying fiscal finance at the department of
economics in Xiamen University. During the school year, He joined the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) in 1981 and continued his study in graduate school in same
discipline. In 1984, He got a master degree and started to work in the Xiamen Special
Economic Zone’s economic institute. After several years working in Xiamen government
agencies, He was appointed as Xiamen Xinglin district Party Secretary (first hand) in
1990. Two years later, He was promoted to be Xiamen’s vice mayor and stayed in that
position for three years. Theoretically speaking, He Lifeng was not a local native official
since he was born in the neighboring province and grew up in Guangdong province.
However, He lived in Xiamen for twenty years since he was 18 years old. He completed
his education and got his first job in Xiamen. In practice, He is considered as a Xiamen
local native official. In 1995, He Lifeng was rotated to Xiamen’s neighboring city,
Quanzhuo, as vice-Party secretary and the acting mayor. Following the usual rule, He
turned to be the mayor the following year. Two years later, He Lifeng was promoted to
the first hand (the Party secretary) of Quanzhuo city. After another three years as the
rotated top official in the province’s capital city at the same rank, He was transferred
back to Xiamen as the first hand (the Party secretary) native political leader.
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Policy making in China often is a product of a combination of rationality, power
struggles, and bureaucratic politics.26 Even being a top leader in Xiamen city, to promote
a local industry policy initiative such as B&B industry development still needs a skill for
politics in the Chinese political structure to get things done. Early in 2006, the second
year of Party Secretary He’s tenure in Xiamen as the top local leader, he gave a talk at a
tourist industry development conference, encouraging local government to “promote fast
development of the emerging B&B industry”.27 As a result, the former German counselor
building was renovated and transformed into the first B&B hostel business in Gulangyu
at the end of that year. But nothing has really happened since then. In the following
year’s spring festival, He offered a night tour in Gulangyu to foreign friends (investors)
and found out that contrary to his thoughts very few tourists stayed on the island at night
because there were no commercial activities or nightlife. Next day, He sent a note to the
GSMC indicating that the GSMC should take “some real actions” to promote the
development of the B&B industry in Gulangyu.28
Although He Lifeng made very clear both in public and private about his ambitions
for the B&B industry development in Gulangyu, B&B development was slow until 2008,
the third year of He’s tenure as a top leader in Xiamen. In May 2008, He made a visiting
tour investigating the development of tourism in Gulangyu and figured out there were
only 12 B&B hostels established in past two years since his first talk. To express his
dissatisfaction about the development of the B&B sector in Gulangyu, He made a
statement that set a clear goal of achieving 3000 B&B beds in Gulangyu by the end of
26

Policy making in China often attributes to two factors: rationality and faction power struggle. Lieberthal and
Oksenberg (1988) introduced the bureaucratic politics in formulating policy.
27 Shao Fangqing. “Apply for World Cultural Heritage! Save Gulangyu?” Diyi Caijing [The First Finance and
Economy Daily] 01-07-2011.
28 Ibid.
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2008. At the same time, He called a “major project work leading group” meeting in order
to mobilize his colleagues to promote the B&B sector development.29 In November 2008,
the city Party Committee held a special meeting discussing the development of the B&B
industry in Gulangyu. In that meeting, the city Party committee discussed “Xiamen
Gulangyu B&B Management Regulations (Trial)”, which was drafted by Siming district
government. The meeting memo, as a local official document, shows that “Siming district
government, the GSMC and other relevant government agencies should work together,
make initiative moves and take proactive action, incorporating the application of World
Cultural Heritage project, which would support and encourage the development of the
B&B industry in Gulangyu.”30
In December 2008, the Regulations became a formal local industry policy as Siming
district government issued “Xiamen Gulangyu B&B Management Regulations (Trial)”
publicly. At the same time, the Xiamen city Party committee and the Xiamen government
forwarded the Regulations to different government agencies as well as made a statement
indicating that ““Xiamen Gulangyu B&B Industry Management Regulations (Trial)”,
which as drafted by Siming district government had been discussed and ratified by the
city “major project work leading group” in the 46 meetings, now forwarded to your
department, please make the effort to follow and enforce the regulations.”31 Since the
promulgation of the Regulations, B&B hostels have increased dramatically during 2009
and 2010 and reached 152 B&B hostels in Gulangyu with the total private investment 3
to 4 hundred million. By the end of 2013, more than ten million tourists visited Gulangyu
29

Leading group has been used as an instrument to bridge top leaders and different sub-ordinate agencies that
implement policies. In practice, leading group is outside the view of public but possesses a considerable weight of
power in the Chinese politics (Lieberthal 2004).
30 Cai Changchun, “Gualngyu Shengyi zhongde Minzi ‘Ermeng’” [Private Investment’s ‘Nightmare’ in Gulangyu’s
World Heritage Application Process], Fazhizhoume [Rule by Law Weekend], 09-04-2013.
31 Ibid.
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Island and the total number of B&B hostels reached 300 including those without
licenses.32
The Policy Changes of the B&B Industry in Gulangyu
The development of the B&B sector turned in another direction beginning in the late
2009 as He Lifeng was transferred to Tianjin as a vice Party secretary and the succeeding
top leader Yu Weiguo was in charge. Table 5.3 illustrates the policymaking and policy
change process directed by two types of local political leaders. It is logical that as the
industry developed rapidly government authority would shift its focus from the
development policy to the regulation policy. However, the case of Gulangyu B&B shows
that local officials’ policy choices with regards to the development of a sector are
determined by individual leaders’ career concerns and their calculations which are
conditioned by their resources and constraints.
Like He Lifeng, Yu Weiguo was born in 1955. But his hometown is in Shandong
province, eastern China. Similar to He Lifeng, Yu went to a neighboring province when
he was eighteen, but became a worker in a chemistry factory in Taicang, Jiangsu
province. Yu joined the CCP in 1975 and went to China People’s University in Beijing in
1979 studying Chinese literature. In 1983, Yu started to work in a research department at
the CCP’s Central Committee Secretariat’s Office. After several years of research work,
Yu was appointed to a mishu (personal secretary) of Ding Guangen—the former Head of
the CCP’s Central Department of Propaganda in 1991. Four years later, at the age of
forty, Yu was a guazhi (temporary transferred duty)33 cadre to the Xiamen government as
32

GSMC 2013 annual work reports.
Gazhi means higher organization delegates a cadre to lower one and serve in a lower level unit for a period while
retaining one's position in the previous unit. It is argued as one of method to attain faster promotion in the Chinese
political hierarchy (Kou and Tsai 2014).
33
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the assistant mayor, and two years later was transferred formally to the Xiamen
government. He became vice mayor of Xiamen in 1999, and then minister of the
Department of Organization (DOO) of Xiamen in 2001 before becoming vice-Party
secretary of the city in 2002. In 2005, Yu was promoted to deputy vice-minister of DOO
of Fujian, and minister of DOO of Fujian the following year. In June 2009, Yu became
the Party secretary of Xiamen.
It is not clear if there was a faction power struggle between He Lifeng and Yu
Weiguo. What public records show is that Yu Weiguo and He Lifeng shared no
overlapping working experiences. When Yu came to Xiamen from Beijing, He Lifeng
was transferred to a neighboring city as a rotated top political leader. While He Lifeng
was transferred back to Xiamen, Yu had been promoted to the head of provincial DOO.
The only overlapping period of theses two top leaders was two and half years when they
were both provincial Party Standing Committee members between 2006 and 2009.
Tirole (1994, p. 7) introduced the theory of career concerns that argues that civil
servants and politicians “are concerned by the effect of their current performance not so
much on their monetary reward, but rather on their reputation or image in view of future
promotion.” Performance measurement for local officials in China comes form the Cadre
Evaluation System (CES), which is the major instrument that the central government has
used to manage its cadre corps. Economic growth measured by numbers of GDP growth
rate has been one of major criteria to determine whether a particular local leader should
be promoted to a higher rank (Li and Zhuo 2005). Another two important factors that
determine local officials’ prospect of promotion are personal characteristics mainly age
and education, and personal connections with their superiors in charge of promotion.
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Table 5.3 The Policy Making and Policy Changes of Gulangyu B&B Industry in Xiamen

The Party secretary of Xiamen
He, Lifeng (2005.05-2009.05)

Yu, Weiguo (2009.06-2013.05)
（2009.05-2013.05）

(（2005.05-2009.05）
2005 2006 2007 2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

The Chief Executive of GSMC

2013

2014

Cao Fang

Cheng, Jianming（2003.10-2012.07）

（2012.07-2014.08）

The Party secretary of Siming district
Zheng, Yunfeng

Pei, Jingui

Wang

You, Wenchang

4

7

1
9

1
2
8

2.1
2.2

3

4, 5

3

5

6

He Lifeng administration (2005.05—2009.05)
1) Talk in a tourism industry development conference in April 2006
2) A note to GSMC indicating that GSMC should take “some real actions” to promote the development of B&B
industry in Gulangyu in February 2007.
3) A visiting tour, a statement that sets a clear goal of achieving 3000 B&B beds in Gulangyu by the end of 2008, and a
“major project work leading group” meeting in May 2008.
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4) A special meeting of the city Party Committee discussing the development of B&B industry in Gulangyu in
November 2008.
5) The promulgation of “Xiamen Gulangyu B&B Management Regulations (Trial)” in December 2008.

Yu Weiguo administration (2009.06—2013.05)
1.Permission from GSMC in addition to “six-license” process of B&B hostel in May 2010.
2-1.CPC standing committee’s enquiry on “improve Gulangyu’s tourism environment”
2-2.Established “Gulangyu Scenic Improvement Work Leading Group” charged by GSMC
3.Established “Gulangyu Applying World Cultural Heritage Work Leading Group” and the former Mayor was in
charge of the group.
4. An informal administrative order that temporarily suspended the application of B&B hostel in Gulangyu issued by
GSMC
5. Open the application
6. Re-closed the process
7. Re-opened the process
8. An informal administrative order using the form of a meeting memo signed by several government agencies issued
to terminate the application
9. “Gulangyu Applying for World Cultural Heritage Improvement Projects—A Specific Plan for Gulangyu B&B
Industry” issued by GSMC

Source: Compiled by author.
Unlike He Lifeng, Yu was a typical mishu cadre34 sent-down from the central
organization of the CCP who lacked local government experiences. Although he worked
in Xiamen for ten years, Yu was truly a transferred official. More importantly, compared
to native leader He Lifeng, Yu had personal tie with higher rank officials both at the
center and provincial DOO who were in charge of promotion. While He Lifeng had to
respond to “support” constituency’s interests in order to secure his position, Yu just
needed to build up an impressive image in the view of party officials for future
promotion. By “support” constituency, it doesn’t mean specific constituencies within the
electorate. Rather, it means the social and commercial elite, not the political elite. In the
context of China, this means urban district level officials or local businesspersons.
Due to the term limits and rotation system, Yu faced short-time pressure to show his
ability for local governance in only 2 to 3 years so as to impress both his superiors and
the local public to win promotion. One of the best strategies for him to demonstrate his

“Mishu cluster” is an important faction in the power struggle of Chinese politics. It refers to as Graeme Smith argues
that “working as a sent-down cadre enhances their prospects of promotion” (Smith 2010).
34
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ability was to pursue “achievement projects” for an instant success.35 In addition, as the
succeeding transferred top leader, Yu needed to differentiate himself from the previous
native Party secretary through his unique “achievement projects.” Yu concentrated his
efforts on building the new city image—to make Gulanyu one of the World Cultural
Heritages.36
The dual administrative system of Gulangyu offered an opportunity for the new
leader to introduce his “achievement project” and to intervene in the affairs of an evergrowing local tourism industry. In May 2010, the second year of Yu’s tenure, the process
of the six-license application of a B&B hostel added one more step—the permission from
GSMC. Since GSMC is a subordinate agency of Xiamen government and the Party
committee determines major affairs of the city, the Party secretary Yu gained final say
over the direction of Gulangyu tourism industry development, specifically B&B
development.
In January 2010, Yu acquired another top position in the City People’s Congress
(CPC) standing committee in addition to the Party secretary position, which is not normal
practice in local political structure. Yu chose to show his local governance innovation by
introducing the CPC standing committee’s enquiry on local government with regards to
specific topics. The first enquiry of Xiamen’s history was held on November 29, 2010
and the topic was about how to “improve Gulangyu’s tourism environment.” In order to
follow up the issues raised in the enquiry, Xiamen government delegated to GSMC who

Short-time horizon in each locality causes short-term behavior of local officials eager for instant success. This is why
many local officials are fanatic in “achievement projects” to demonstrate their ability to impress their superiors and the
public. Achievement projects mainly refer to constructing fancy skyscraper, new airports, or city image with the money
squeezed from public goods spending.
36 Heritage tourism as a new way to promote local economy discussed by scholars, see Qin et. alt 2011.
35
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coordinated with nine relevant government agencies to establish the “Gulangyu Scenic
Improvement Work Leading Group.”37
In December 2010, Xiamen government held the 119th executive meeting and
decided to establish “Gulangyu Applying World Cultural Heritage Work Leading
Group”, and the former Mayor was in charge of the group. The GSMC was responsible
for the daily work of the applications and for coordinating government agencies in order
to submit the application in 2013. Shortly after the establishment of the leading group, the
GSMC issued an informal administrative order that temporarily suspended the
application of B&B hostels in Gulangyu in the name of improving Gulangyu’s tourism
environment and World Cultural Heritage application. Without knowing the reasons, the
suspension of applications was lifted in July 2011 after a few months of rejection. But the
suspension began again in November. Two or three months later, the suspension was
lifted again and finally in July 2012, an informal administrative order in the form of a
meeting memo signed by several government agencies was issued to terminate all the
application to this point. This revolving door of local administrative orders resulted in
almost 200 B&B hostels with a partial license or without any license doing business.
In May 2013, the GSMC issued “Gulangyu Applying for World Cultural Heritage
Improvement Projects—A Specific Plan for Gulangyu B&B Industry” (the Plan),” which
aims to shut down at least half the number of B&B hostels on the island. The
promulgation of the Plan as the turning point of policy making about the B&B industry in
Gulangyu seriously threatens the property rights of private investors. In late 2013, many
B&B hostel owners were detained for 5 to 15 days by Siming district police station and

Jiang Shengyang and Feng Shijie “To Make Effective Supervision: on Xiamen City People’s Congress Standing
Committee Three Topic Enquiries.” China Daily 04-13-2011.
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fined severely by different local government agencies. One month before the
promulgation of the Plan, Yu gave a talk to the GSMC, which praised the achievement of
GSMC on the job of Gulangyu improvement and encouraged them to work harder in
order to “better protect and governance Gulangyu.”38
5.4 Conclusion
Local officials’ role in local industry policymaking is not a rational response to the
problem; it is not simply strategic actions in response to faction power struggles; and it is
not muddling through decision-making in bureaucratic politics. Performance evaluation
systems associated with the prospect of promotion have motivated local political leaders
to pursue policy initiatives. However, different types of local political leaders conditioned
to resources and constraints determine the policy choices that local officials can make in
order to satisfy goals. While native leaders with fewer resources and greater constraints
are more likely to respond to “support” constituency’s interests, rotated officials,
especially transferred officials from the center, are more likely to build impressive
images or short-term “achievement projects” at the price of local public good.
Local political officials formulate sometimes contradictory or conflicting local
economic policies, although not just because of bureaucratic politics decision-making.
Instead, these conflicting economic policies come from strategic calculations according
to each local leader’s attributes and resources. In the case of Gulangyu B&B industry
policy making in Xiamen, the policy changes of the B&B industry have not served to
regulate the market but to promote local leader’s achievement project, which has created
room for predatory activities on local private property rights. The same local state being
38

“The Party secretary Yu Weiguo’s important note to Gulangyu Management Committee’s work on April 4th, 2013”
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developmental or predatory was a result of the change from native to transferred key
local political leader. Understanding the variations of property rights, therefore, requires a
close examination of local political leaders.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
This research hopes to contribute some new perspective to current studies on property
rights in China. A lot of existing literature has systematically studied the causes of
economic growth. This study takes a different approach, which, instead of directly
looking for the causes of economic growth, tries to answer why private investors invest in
the face of the commitment problem and why some local officials actively protected
property rights more than others. To answer these questions, I provide a game-theoretic
model to study the political economy of property rights in China, that is, a bargaining
game between a firm and a local political official. This political-economics explanation
sheds light on the variation in the protection of private property rights for private firms
across China rather than regional variations of economic performance.
6.1 The Summary of the Study
In this study, I argue that property rights protection results from a bargaining
game between a local political actor and a private investor under the incentive structure
of the Cadre Evaluation System (CES) designed by the central government. As the
personnel control system literature shows, official promotion is mainly determined by
officials’ political and economic performance in local jurisdiction, their age, and degree
of education, and informal personal connections with their superiors. As the competition
has been getting more severe, the evaluation criteria, such as performance, age and
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education degree, have been set higher and higher. Several criteria of local economic
performance are actually out of control of the local political leaders. Young and welleducated local officials are more preferred for further promotion. In addition, age limits
to retirement and the rotation system shortened many officials’ political career. These
factors make local officials’ promotion harder.
At the same time, compared to political actors in democratic regime, there are two
more distinct features of career patterns for political actors within the Chinese power
hierarchy: 1) almost permanent tenure as long as they have secured an office; 2) almost
no job option outside the political career when you are in the system. All of the
aforementioned constraints place more weight on local political actors’ calculation with
regards to their strategies to achieve their goals in terms of property rights protection.
Under the current institutional arrangements, private firms are on their own to resist
local officials’ predatory activities. However, resources and constraints as results of
firms’ characteristics have impact on private firms’ post-bargaining power in the
bargaining relationship with local officials. Only certain firm-specific characteristics can
greatly enhance private investors’ bargaining power, which makes private firms in better
position to protect their investment.
There are three players in the local economy, Government is the principal, the local
political official serves as the supervisor, and the Private entrepreneur is the agent. In the
context of China, political actors are local political leaders, economic actors are
indigenous private entrepreneurs, and government includes central and local. I detach
political actors from government because the goals of government are not always
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identical with political actors and hence I reconsider the role of local political leaders on
economic development in general and property rights protection in particular.
The goal of government both central and local is tax revenue. The primary and
foremost concern of local political leaders is to stay in office and being promoted to a
higher rank. But the ultimate goal of local officials is to acquire more wealth and secure
their possessions. In other words, the pursuit of political power is the means to achieve
the end (wealth acquisition). For the indigenous private entrepreneur, what he/she wants
is not only to maximize profit but also to secure their property rights.
As the discussion of the CES shows in chapter 2, local political actors face
political imperatives and policy tasks set from upper-level governments. These tasks
include promoting economic and fiscal revenue growth, boosting local employment, and
providing public goods and services. Local officials are evaluated based on how well they
accomplish these policy tasks. But they are constrained by the lack of fiscal resources as
a result of the fiscal reform in early 1990s (Tao and Yang 2008; Yang 2006). Therefore,
local officials turned their hands toward the private sector. The model assumes that local
officials are potential predators and private firms are their prey. The predator and prey
interact strategically in the context in which the central government evaluates the local
officials on the basis of the cadre performance evaluation system.
I model the relationship as a bargaining game with conflicting goals. Under the
incentive structure of the CES, a firm has strong bargaining power at the time of entry
because local officials are eager to attract investment and understand that the firm has
other options. However, once the firm has made sector-specific investment, its bargaining
power diminishes. Only certain firm-specific characteristics can empower private
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investors’ bargaining power, which constrains local officials’ predatory behaviors
towards private investment. In this way, firms with strong post-entry bargaining power
enjoy a high level of credible commitment from the local government as local officials
are under the pressures of performance-based evaluation by his/her superiors. But weak
firms are vulnerable to the local officials’ predatory activities, and therefore need to rely
on their social networks or bribery to overcome the commitment problem. In particular,
all else being equal, the availability of an exit option greatly enhances the private firms’
post-entry bargaining power vis-à-vis local political actors. This hypothesis has been
tested statistically in Chapter 3. Also, in Chapter 3, the media reports on governmentrelated property rights expropriation cases, further supporting the hypotheses.
Another equilibrium that emerges from the interaction between local political
supervisors and economic agents is the symbiotic relationship between less favorable
local political officials and private entrepreneurs, which creates conditions similar to the
secure property rights at the local level. Individual local official will calculate their
resources and weakness in order to make their choices under the CES. If they are near
age limits to retirement or less educated, and above all, have no personal tie with their
superiors, they will have nearly zero chance to be promoted to a higher rank in the
bureaucratic hierarchy and thus tend to pursue economic interests rather than political.
More importantly, these local officials who are relatively disadvantageous in the power
structure realize that their political survival needs support of local economic actors, and
actively cultivate ties with them. They provide property rights at a local level as returns
for political-economic alliance. This symbiotic relationship between less favorable local
political actors and private entrepreneurs provides a condition similar to property rights,
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which fostered the private sector and paved the way for long-term economic growth in
certain localities.
I argue that under the current institutions of CES and the cadre rotation system,
the attributes of local political leaders affect their behaviors with regards to private
investment. Local political leaders tend to protect private property rights when a
symbiotic relationship between local officials and private entrepreneurs is feasible. All
else being equal, native local political leaders have lower transaction costs, face more
social constraints, and gain extra benefits in establishing symbiotic relationship with local
private entrepreneurs and, therefore tend to protect private property rights more than
those rotated ones. Chapter 4 provides systematic empirical evidence from Guangdong
province both cross-sectionally and over time to tests this hypothesis by investigating the
characteristics of 263 prefecture-level local political leaders between 1992 and 2008, and
find that native political leaders promoted substantially higher levels of private
investment—the proxy for the protection of private property rights. The results are robust
to various alternative specifications, including models that account for heterogeneous
regional characteristics, initial economic conditions, and socioeconomic factors. Chapter
5 further provides a detailed case study on local industry policymaking in Xiamen, which
also supports this hypothesis.
To be true, the protection of property rights afforded by this relationship is
fleeting and localized, but in a country where credible property rights institutions are
weak, this mechanism has been effective in fostering the private sector in some localities
at some times. More importantly, this study fills a void in the literature of political
economy under authoritarian governments. It points to the unique authoritarian political

119

arrangement in China, where the central government is growth-oriented, and local
officials enjoy a great deal of discretionary power. The model demonstrates that the
protection of private property rights is not exogenously imposed by the central
government but derives from the interactions between local officials and private firms.
6.2 Prospects of Further Research
Two main challenges for the empirical studies in this research are measurement
and data quality. For the challenge of measurement, I have used private investment in
fixed assets as an indicator to measure the security of property rights. This is a better
proxy than GDP measurement since this kind of investment bears considerable risks with
only promises of future revenue whereas GDP growth may not require the commitment
to protect private property rights as long as the local leaders could gain economic
resources for higher authorities or state-owned financial institutions. I also used the
proportion of private investment on total investment as another way to measure the level
of property rights protection.
For property rights expropriations, I used arbitrary fess and fines collected by
local government as an indicator to measure the level of indirect taking of property rights
since these activities are common practices by local officials with regards to private
firms. I also used media reports on government-related outright taking property rights
cases to measure the level of property rights protection.
Data quality is a common concern to any study on contemporary China. I tested
the hypothesis of the model using various sources of data: biographies of local political
leaders, statistical yearbooks, media reports, government reports, interview notes, and
other fieldwork notes. Empirical results I tested in this research are consistent with the
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theoretical prediction. All the findings suggest firms with high level of FSAs enjoy better
property rights protection and having native local political leaders promoted substantially
higher levels of private investment-the proxy of property rights protection.
As for testing the local political leaders’ hypothesis, while my evidence focuses
on Guangdong province, the symbiotic logic can apply to other provinces as well. Further
study can be conducted by using a nationwide private investment dataset to test this
hypothesis.
Based on this research, it is worthy to explore the repeated game between local
political actors and private investors. For one-short game, local political actors and
private investors found themselves in a prisoners’ dilemma game. However, in an
infinitely repeated version of the game, both players may choose to play, for example, a
trigger strategy and therefore the “common interest” may be realized. The study also can
explore the conditions under which both the local political actor and the private
entrepreneur will cooperate with each other.
Moreover, there is a need, both intellectual and practical, to further explore the
sources that affect these political-economic dynamics and how these interactions at the
micro-level lead to institutional change at the macro-level. One of the sources that may
affect local political-economic dynamics is the impact of varying forms of formal and
informal institutions in fostering collective bargaining. In the project involving business
associations, I have tries to explore the effects of business associations on the bargaining
relationship between private firms and local officials. Contrary to the existing studies,
which generally consider business associations as state corporatist instruments, my indepth comparative case study shows the structure of business associations and the type of
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association leaders in the bargaining game with local political leaders determining the
effectiveness of the organization in terms of defending members’ interests and providing
public goods such as property rights protection.
Another source that may also affect local political-economic dynamics is in the
form of corruption. Corruption is often treated as detrimental to economic development
(Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Yet, some argue for efficiency-enhancing corruption, the
effects of which may be positive (Leff 1964; Huntington 1968; Li and Wu 2010). Other
studies further distinguish among different types of corruption (Shleifer and Vishny
1993; Sun 2004; Wedeman 1997; Manion 2012). Many studies focus on the coexistence
of rapid growth and rising corruption in China (Li and Wu 2010; Wademan 2012). The
further study will explore how corruption, in the form of the mutually beneficial
exchange between the local official and the private investor, becomes a source of
property rights protection, and sees how it works in the local political-economic
dynamics in China.
Finally, further research projects can go in a different direction that will focus on
the interplay between political institutions and political connections to explain the huge
regional disparities in China’s rapid economic development. It will examine empirically
how the interplay of promotion incentives and political connections of local political
leaders affect investment patterns.
In this research project, it will demonstrate that the huge regional disparities in
economic growth and investment variations can partly be explained by the interplay of
promotion incentives and political connections of local political leaders. Guided by a
simple career concerns model with option of with and without political connections, it
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will show that strategic actions and purposeful choices by local political leaders are key
to understanding the regional disparities in economic growth and investment patterns.
The logic is that local political leaders seek investment when they have strong incentives
to promote growth, as economic growth is one major measure to judge their job
performance and their job performance will influence their promotion results. However,
political connection networks will determine what kind of investment local political
leaders are looking for. Those who have political connections with the higher authorities
will have an advantage for attracting the allocation of government support such as huge
government projects, whereas those who do not have connections tend to promote local
private sector in their jurisdictions. As a result, the regions with connected political
leaders have relatively higher growth rate but lower level of private entrepreneurship
activities.
Using political connections as explanatory variable, it will explore the
characteristics of local officials to test the hypothesis and will collect data on top political
leaders in 333 prefecture municipalities in China between 1992 and 2008.39 A mayor or
the party secretary is defined as connected if at least one of his past colleagues,
classmates, or natives is the provincial party secretary or governor.
In order to test the hypothesis, three dependent variables are identified: capital
construction and collective-owned investment in fixed assets, the annual GDP growth
rate, and private investment in fixed assets in 333 municipal-level cities in China from
1992 to 2008. The annual GDP growth rate is to measure the overall economic
performance; the construction and collective-owned investment in fixed assets measure
39

I start from 1992 because this is the division year of private enterprise as the introduction of the Company law paved
the way to the rapid private investment. More importantly, this is the year to which the detailed biographical data of
political leaders and private investment in fixed assets can be traced back.
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the allocation of government support; and the private investment in fixed assets is an
indicator to measure the development of private economy. A host of control variables,
mainly including initial economic conditions and geographical variables, are also
involved in my model. I expect the empirical test will support my hypotheses.
This project is built upon unresolved performance versus connections debates in
the literature on the political economy of development and sheds light on this issue by
examining the interplay of promotion incentives and political connections on economic
development in China. Also, this research is one of the first attempts to address the
politics of investment-driven growth in the context of huge regional disparities in
economic development. Finally, in discussing the role of local officials on economic
growth, scholars often focus on provincial leaders, county and township level officials;
mine is to study behaviors of intermediate level political leaders.
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APPENDIX A – ABOUT THE SURVEY DATA
The Survey on Privately Owned Enterprises in China used in this study was jointly
conducted in 2012 by the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), the
State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), the United Front Work
Department (UFWD), and the Institute of Chinese Private Economy at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). It is the most recent survey among a series of
similar ones conducted by the same team every two years since the 1990s. We obtained
the survey data from the University Services Center at the Chinese University of Hong
Kong. A detailed description of the survey is available on the center’s website
(wwwusc.cuhk.edu.hk/DCS31-16.aspx). According to the description, the survey pooled
across two samples, one sample (653 firms) obtained from the fixed observation points of
the ACFIC and the other (4,094 firms) randomly selected from the population of all
private firms as of 2011. For the random sample, a proportionate stratified sampling
method was employed on the strata of the thirty-one provincial units in China. In total,
the survey collected data on 4,747 firms.

I admit the weaknesses of the survey. First, it is not a purely representative sample
because a portion of it comes from the ACFIC’s fixed observation points. But the good
this is that the proportion of the fixed observations dropped significantly in the 2012
136

survey from almost 40% to 13.76%. Second, because the ACFIC was a major organizer,
the sampling seems skewed toward ACFIC members. Finally, the survey included a
nontrivial portion of missing values in most financial indicators, decreasing the sample
size available for empirical analysis. Despite these weaknesses, the survey has been
extensively used by many scholars and produced fruitful findings.
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APPENDIX B – ABOUT THE MDEIA REPORTS OF GOVERNMENT-RELATED
PROPERTY RIGHTS EXPROPRIATION CASES
I acknowledge the limitations of our cases. First, the media exposure cases are not
exhaustive since we are unable to include all property rights expropriation cases. It is
likely that most of the government appropriation cases may not be made public. On the
one hand, the private owners may, for instance, have a chance to negotiate with local
governments regarding their property, so they will not expose their story in order to save
the local officials’ face. On the other hand, large firms or those owners who have good
connections with the media may have better chances to reveal their experiences. In
addition, all the 279 cases we documented are related to direct expropriation. In practice,
the indirect expropriation cases are perhaps far more common than the ones shown here
(Nee and Opper 2012).
Second, sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish between entrepreneurial crimes and
government-related property rights appropriation involving private entrepreneurs because
criminal charges are a common tool local governments use to prey on private firms. The
number of criminal cases filed against private entrepreneurs rose sharply against the
backdrop of the steady improvement of the legal status of private businesses. According
to the report published by the Chinese Entrepreneurial Crime Prevention Research Centre
at Beijing Normal University, 483 out of 599 entrepreneurial crimes in 2013 were
committed or allegedly committed by private entrepreneurs. This is a significant increase
from 2009 when private entrepreneurs committed merely 49 out of 84 entrepreneurial
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crimes (Ren 2014). The most common charges brought against private entrepreneurs
were illegally absorbing public savings, fraudulent fundraising, misappropriation of
funds, and tax evasions.
In some cases, private entrepreneurs were sentenced to prison for entrepreneurial
crimes while still retaining their control over the firms and properties as shown in the
“Huang Guangyu case.” In other cases, local governments confiscated private firms and
properties in the name of cracking down on organized crimes in which private
entrepreneurs were allegedly doing business with crime syndicates as demonstrated in the
so-called “Chongqing model.” For our study, we include only the cases in which firms or
properties were confiscated by the government for whatever crimes they committed or
allegedly committed.
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